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A STUDY AND COMPARISON OF THE CONSUMPTION BASIS OF TAXATION
1FOREWORD
This t r e a t i s e  i s  a study and comparison 
©f the th re e  measures o f  economic w ell-being  
and th e i r  use as bases f a r  fin an c in g  govern­
ment. P a r tic u la r  emphasis i s  given to  the 
study ©f the consumption b asis  e f  ta x a tio n .
Submitted in  compliance w ith the requirem ents 
fo r  the Master e f  A rts degree in  Taxation.
Douglas W. Blevins
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PART I .  IRTRODIICTION
A. Sources o f Revenue
“Taxes a re  a privilege n e t a  burden", sa id  Juistto# O liver Wendell 
Holmes, “they  a re  th e  p r ic e  ve pay fo r  c iv i l i z a t io n ” .
The p r ic e  o f c iv i l i z a t io n  i s  an ever in c reas in g  one u n t i l  today i t  
tak es  about 20 p ercen t o f our n a tio n a l income.
P ub lic  expend itu res befo re  th e  R evolu tionary  War were very modest. 
Government assumed a  very  lim ite d  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  p u b lic  works and none 
fo r  th e  s o c ia l  w elfare  o f th e  people governed. P ub lic  o f f i c i a l s  e i th e r  
depended on fe e s  fo r  th e i r  pay o r  served g ra tu ito u s ly .  One ta x  n o t seen 
today th a t  e x is te d  in  C o lon ial tim es was th e  church ta x  supporting  the 
M in is te r  and h is  fam ily  as w e ll as b u ild in g  and m ain tain ing  th e  church i t ­
s e l f .  Some p re se n t day support from th e  government could be s a id  to  occur 
through ta x  f re e  income from p erso n a l c o n tr ib u tio n s  and through exemptions 
from s a le s  tax es  and p roperty  ta x e s .
S everal d i f f e r e n t  tax es  were used in  C o lon ia l tim es to  support th e
v ario u s  c o lo n ie s , such a s : p o l l  ta x e s , fa c ility  ta x e s , and th e  p ro p erty
ta x .  Each ta x  rece iv ed  p a r t ic u la r  emphasis In  d i f f e r e n t  p a r ts  o f th e
co u n try . New England emphasized th e  p roperty  ta x  w hile a lso  u t i l i z i n g  th e
o th e r two. P o ll  tax es  were f i r s t  used in  th e  South and th e  middle co lo n ies
bu t l a t e r  more re l ia n c e  was p laced  on ex c ise  ta x e s , m ostly d u tie s  on
commerce. This prim ary re lia n c e  on d i f f e r e n t  ways o f fin an c in g  government 
*
had a  profound e f f e c t  on th e  p o l i t i c a l  aims o f th e se  d i f f e r e n t  segments o f 
our e a r ly  n a tio n  u n t i l  th e  C iv i l  War and even u n t i l  World War I .
The p o l l  t a x  i s  now used in  only 7 s ta te s  and th e re  i t  i s  used m ostly 
to  d ise n fra n c h ise  th e  Negro vo te  and to  p e rp e tu a te  th e  ex is ten ce  o f c e r ta in  
p o l i t i c a l  m achines. I t  i s  in  danger o f being e ra d ic a te d  by a  C o n s titu tio n a l
9/
Amendment when used fo r  v o te r  r e g i s t r a t io n  purposes.
The fa c u lty  ta x ,  supposedly begun by s ta tu te  in  New Plymouth in  16^3, 
taxed  th e  c o lo n is ts  according to  th e i r  e s ta te s  o r f a c u l t ie s  or r a th e r  t h e i r  
r e tu rn s  and gains from p ro p erty  as w e ll as t ra d e s .  The p ro p erty  t m  i s  
s t i l l  w ith  us today in  much th e  same form as in  e a r ly  c o lo n ia l days bu t 
w ith  th e  a d d itio n  o f ta x in g  in ta n g ib le  p roperty  as w e ll as ta n g ib le  p ro p e rty .
During th e  i l l - f a t e d  C onfederation the  payment o f  tax es  by th e  co lo n ies  
was considered  a  v o lu n ta ry  c o n tr ib u tio n  o r c h a r i ty  w ith  th e  subsequent 
r e s u l t  t h a t  th e  c e n tr a l  government d e fau lted  on i t s  d e b t. Out o f th i s  
debacle a ro se  th e  C o n s titu tio n a l Convention o f 1789 and th e  new F ed era tio n  
w ith  ample ta x in g  powers. This convention gave to  Congress th e  power to  la y  
d u t ie s ,  and c o l le c t  im posts, e x c ise s  and to  pay d eb ts , provide fo r  th e  common 
defense and g en e ra l w elfa re  of th e  U nited S ta te s .
U n til  th e  C iv i l  War government f in an ce  r e l ie d  upon th e  t a r i f f .  Quickly
th e  Congress passed an income ta x  but i t  never provided adequate revenue to
f ig h t  a  war so o th e r  tax es  were c a lle d  in to  p la y . A fte r  th e  C iv il  War s o c ia l
and economic d isco n ten t were m anifest throughout th e  s t a t e s .  These were th e
days o f Henry George, who advocated th e  s in g le  ta x  based on land  v a luesj
Edward Bellamy, who p o rtray ed  a  U topian n a tio n  in  "Looking Backward 2000-1887”
where ta x a t io n  was unnecessary; add Grover C leveland under whose a d m in is tra tio n
th e  Supreme Court ru le d  th e  fe d e ra l  income ta x  u n c o n s ti tu tio n a l .  On
J u ly  1919f W. H. T a ft proposed an Amendment to  th e  C o n s titu tio n  th a t  would
allow  a  p ro g ress iv e  income ta x .  On October 3, 1913, a  new income ta x  law 
«
went in to  e f f e c t  as  a s e c tio n  o f th e  Undervood-Simons T a r i f f  A ct. This was 
ju s t  i n  tim e to  h e lp  fin an ce  th e  f i r s t  r e a l  g lo b a l war th a t  was to  s t a r t  in  
191^. The fe d e ra l  income ta x  has su ffe re d  many ups and downs u n t i l  today i t  
p rov ides more th an  86 p e rcen t o f  th e  t o t a l  revenue. O ther fe d e ra l  tax es  a re : 
ex c ise  ta x e s ,  11^) custom d u tie s ,  1$; and e s ta te  and g i f t  ta x e s , 2^ .
10.
The S ta te s  and th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  su b d iv is ions have a lso  experim ented w ith  
Various ta x in g  com binations inc lud ing  death  ta x e s , s a le s  ta x e s , income ta x e s , 
p ro p e rty  ta x e s ,  and ex c ise  ta x e s . Today major s ta t e  revenue sources a re  
s a le s  ta x e s ,  25$ J motor fu e l  ta x e s , l 8$; motor v eh ic le  ta x e s , 8$j p ersonal 
income ta x e s ,  13$ j co rp o ra tio n  income ta x e s , 6$; p ro p erty  ta x e s , 3$ ; liq u o r  
and tobacco ta x e s , 9$> s p e c ia l  business ta x e s , 9$ ; and m iscellaneous ta x e s , 6$ . 
L ocal revenue sources a re : p ro p erty  ta x e s , 88$; ex c ise  and s a le s  ta x e s , 6$ ;
income ta x e s ,  1$; and m iscellaneous ta x e s , 5$•
Why th e se  ta x  monies a re  spen t and how they  a re  spen t have no p lace  in  
t h i s  paper b u t here i s  a p re se n ta tio n  o f how th e  combined governments 
g e n e ra lly  spend th e i r  income* About 30 p ercen t o f  th e  t o t a l  combined ta x  
revenues goes in to  n a tio n a l defense and fo re ig n  a id .  About 2k p e rcen t goes 
in to  h e a l th ,  w e lfa re , and farm  a id .  About 13 p ercen t i s  spen t fo r  education . 
About ^ p e rcen t i s  used up in  overhead c o s ts  of le g i s la t io n ,  a d m in is tra tio n , 
c o u r ts ,  and p ro te c tio n  a g a in s t f i r e ,  crim e, and s o c ia l  d iso rd e rs . About 6 p e r -  
cen t goes re s p e c tiv e ly  to  highways, i n t e r e s t ,  and m iscellaneous c la s s i f ic a t io n s .  
V eterans, and tra n s p o r ta t io n  and n a tu ra l  reso u rces  each tak e  3 p e rcen t w hile 
th e  p o s ta l  system and p u b lic  u t i l i t i e s  used up 5 p e rc en t. The ta x  d o lla rs  
expended by th e  th re e  le v e ls  o f  government has in creased  $75 billion s in ce  1953* 
The c u rre n t estim ated  annual in c rease  i s  $12 b i l l io n .
B. P r in c ip le s  of T axation
"P e rfe c t un ifo rm ity  and p e r fe c t  e q u a lity  of ta x a tio n  in  a l l  th e  a sp ec ts  
i n  which human Blinds can view i t ,  i s  a  b ase less  dream." So s a id  .the  Supreme 
C ourt o f th e  U nited Otea- in  th e  case o f  P a tto n  v . B r a d y .3 Not w ith stand ing  
such a  sta tem en t c e r ta in  s tandards have been proposed fo r  ta x  system s.
1 . Canons o f Adam Smith.
When th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  ta x a t io n  a re  re fe r re d  to  th e  m ajo rity  o f 
people  th in k  in s ta n t ly  Of th e  famous fo u r canons o f th a t  p h y s io c ra tie  
sc h o la r  Adam Sm ith. I t  might do w e ll to  re p e a t them:
11.
1. The su b jec ts  of every s ta te  ought to  c o n tr ib u te  towards 
th e  support of th e  Government as n ea rly  as p o ss ib le  in  p ro ­
p o rtio n  to  t h e i r  re sp e c tiv e  a b i l i t i e s ,  i . e . ,  in  p ro p o rtio n  
to  th e  revenue which they  re sp e c tiv e ly  enjoy under th e  p ro ­
te c t io n  of th e  s ta te .
2 . The ta x  which each in d iv id u a l i s  bound to  pay ought to  j 
be c e r ta in  and not a r b i t r a r y .  The tim e of payment, th e  maimer 
of payment, th e  Q uantity  to  be p a id , ought a l l  to  be c le a r  
and p la in  to  th e  co n tr ib u to r  and to  every o th er person .
3 . Every ta x  ought to  be le v ie d  a t  th e  tim e or in  th e  manner 
in  which i t  i s  m ostly to  be convenient fo r  th e  c o n tr ib u to r
to  pay i t .
t .  Every ta x  ought to  be so co n triv ed  as both to  tak e  out 
and keep out of th e  pockets of th e  people as l i t t l e  as 
p o ss ib le  over and above what i t  b rings in to  th e  pub lic  
tre a s u ry  o f th e  S ta te .
These canons, w hile w idely quoted fo r  over 150 y ea rs , a re  now
inadequate fo r  a  modern w elfare  o rie n te d  economy. Modern econom ists f i r s t
s e t  goals as o b je c tiv e s  fo r  th e  economic system th en  they  c re a te  p r in c ip le s
o f ta x a t io n  to  be ap p lied  in  a t ta in in g  th o se  g o a ls . "The consensus of
op in ion  in  p re se n t day so c ie ty  i s  considered  to  regard  four goals as of
paramount im portance fo r  optimum economic w e lfa re : ( l )  Maximum freedom
o f ch o ice , c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  w elfa re  of o th e rs ; (2) Optimum standards
o f l iv in g ,  in  term s o f a v a ila b le  reso u rces  and tech n iq u es , and in  th e  l i g h t
o f consumer and factor-ow ner p re fe ren ces ; ( 3) An optimum r a t e  o f economic
growth; and (4) A d is t r ib u t io n  o f income in  conform ity w ith  th e  s tandards
o f e q u ity  c u rre n tly  accepted hy s o c ie ty . ’1^
2 . C h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f ta x  system s.
In  term s o f th e se  g o a ls , th re e  major p r in c ip le s  or d e s ira b le
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  o f th e  ta x  system have come to  be g en era lly  accepted:
1 . Economic E ffe c t. The ta x  s tru c tu re  must be e s ta b lish e d  in  
such a way as to  avoid in te rfe re n c e  w ith  the  a tta inm en t of th e  
optimum a llo c a t io n  and use of reso u rces  and, when p o s s ib le , to  
a s s i s t  in  th e  a tta inm en t of th e  optimum.
2 . E qu ity . The d is t r ib u t io n  of burden of th e  ta x  must conform 
w ith  th e  p a tte rn s  of income d is t r ib u t io n  regarded as  th e  optimum 
by th e  consensus of opinion in  contemporary so c ie ty .
3 . Minimum Costs of C o lle c tio n  and Compliance, c o n s is te n t w ith  
e f f e c t iv e  enforcem ent. This r u le  re q u ire s  th a t  ta x e s  be e s t ­
a b lish e d  in  such a manner as  to  minimize th e  r e a l  co s ts  o f 
c o l le c t io n ,  in  term s o f reso u rces  req u ire d  to  c o l le c t  th e  tax es  
and to  comply w ith  th e  ta x  laws on th e  p a r t  of th e  tax p ay ers , as 
w e ll a s  in  term s o f th e  d i r e c t  inconvenience caused th e  tax p ay ers  
in  th e  payment o f  th e  ta x .
3. Economic E f f e c t .
I f  we accep t th e  theo ry  of optimum standard  of l iv in g  ta x a tio n  
must no t a l t e r  or in te r f e r e  w ith  th e  choices of a c tio n  on th e  p a r t  of 
meaner6 o f s o c ie ty  except when in te rfe re n c e  w il l  a llow  c lo se r  a tta in m en t 
o f th e  g o a l. So long as th e  unregulated  fu n c tio n in g  o f th e  economy w i l l  
allow  th e  a tta in m en t o f  optimum output r e la t iv e  to  consumer and f a c to r -  
owner p re fe re n c es , in  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  o f th e  economy, tax es  w i l l  reduce 
th e  le v e ls  of l iv in g  below th e  optimum i f  th ey  a l t e r  consumer or f a c to r -  
owner ch o ices .
On th e  o th e r hand, when autom atic a tta inm en t of th e  optimum 
adjustm ent i s  no t r e a l iz e d ,  ap p ro p ria te  s e le c t io n  o f tax es  may allow  
c lo se r  a tta in m en t o f t h i s  ad justm ent. Thus, fo r  example, i f  th e  consumption 
o f l iq u o r  becomes excessive  r e l a t iv e  to  th e  optimum because r e a l  co s ts  to  
s o c ie ty  due to  drunkenness a re  no t borne by producers of th e  products and 
thus do no t appear in  th e  p r ic e ,  a sp e c ia l ta x  on th i s  product designed to  
reduce consumption and production  to  optimum le v e ls  i s  ju s t i f i a b l e  in  terms
o f th e  goal o f optimum adjustm ent o f p roduction .^
t .  E qu ity . The second requirem ent i s  a  d is t r ib u t io n  of ta x  burden 
among various persons which conforms w ith  accepted s tandards o f eq u ity . 
D eterm ination o f e q u ity  in  ta x a tio n  must r e s t  upon value judgements r e la t in g  
to  th e  o v e ra ll  p a t te rn  o f income d is t r ib u t io n  which i s  regarded as d e s ira b le ;
th e  most e q u ita b le  ta x  system Is  th a t  which i s  most c lo se ly  in  conform ity
With th e  s tan d ard s  of e q u ity  in  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f r e a l  income which a re  
accep ted  as  most d e s ira b le  by th e  consensus o f op in ion  in  so c ie ty .
Two major a sp ec ts  of eq u ity  a re : ( l )  th e  proper trea tm en t o f 
persons in  l ik e  c ircum stances, (2 ) th e  d e s ira b le  r e l a t iv e  trea tm en t of 
persons in  u n lik e  c ircum stances. Two p r in c ip le s  have evolved as  b a s is  fo r  
ta x a t io n ,  b e n e f it  and a b i l i t y .  The b e n e f it  p r in c ip le  involves th e  a p p lic a tio n  
to  th e  e n t i r e  governm ental s e c to r  th e  commercial r u le  th a t  goods be .paid fo r
13.
by th e  u se r . This analogy i s  r a re ly  u se fu l because th e  government, fo r  th e  
most p a r t ,  perform s those  fu n c tio n s  th a t  p r iv a te  e n te rp r is e  can no t undertake 
and because th e  b e n e f it  derived  by th e  c i t iz e n  can not be measured on an 
in d iv id u a l b a s is .  I t  i s  a p p licab le  where b e n e f its  a re  d i r e c t ly  measurable 
such as t o l l  highways, sewage s e rv ic e , and th e  l ik e .  The second p r in c ip le ,  
a b i l i t y ,  i s  th e  one which conforms most c lo se ly  w ith  th e  g en e ra lly  accepted 
s tandards of e q u ity . By a b i l i t y  in  p resen t-d ay  usage, i s  meant simply 
economic w ell-b e in g  or th e  o v e r -a l l  le v e l  o f l iv in g  enjoyed by th e  tax p ay er. 
The p resen t-d ay  ju s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  th e  a b i l i t y  p r in c ip le  i s  simply th e  f a c t  
t h a t ,  from a l l  In d ic a tio n s , i t  i s  in  accord w ith  th e  consensus o f a t t i tu d e s  
toward e q u ity  in  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f r e a l  income and o f  ta x  burden.®
5- Compliance. A f in a l  p r in c ip le  of ta x a tio n  i s  th a t  o f  minimizing 
th e  c o s ts  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f c o l le c t io n  o f th e  ta x e s . E ffe c tiv e  and 
inexpensive a d m in is tra tio n  i s  im portant i f  th e  use o f re so u rces  tp  e f f e c t  
th e  t r a n s f e r  i s  to  be minimized, s in c e , to  th e  ex ten t th a t  re so u rces  a re  
used fo r  t h i s  purpose> th e  output of goods and se rv ic e s  in  th e  economy is  
c u r ta i le d .  L ikew ise, e f fe c t iv e  a d m in is tra tio n  i s  e s s e n t ia l  fo r  maintenance 
o f e q u ity . No m atte r how eq u itab le  a p a r t ic u la r  ta x  s tru c tu re  appears to  
be in  th e o ry , i t  w i l l  no t a c tu a l ly  conform w ith  accepted  s tandards o f equ ity  
i f  s u b s ta n t ia l  numbers o f persons a re  a b le  to  evade or avoid  th e  tax.9
6 . S h if t in g  and Incidence . A very re le v a n t q u estio n  in  th e  mind of 
‘every ta x  s tu d en t i s :  Who u ltim a te ly  b ears  th e  economic burden of a given
ta x  imposed by th e  government? S tudents o f ta x a tio n  have long re a l iz e d  
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th a t  many tax es  do no t " s ta y  pu t" upon th e  person o r business u n it  which 
i n i t i a l l y  pays th e  ta x .  In  some in s tan c e s  th e  ta x  law i s  phrased in  such a 
way as  to  push th e  ta x  on to  someone o th e r than  where th ey  a r e  o r ig in a l ly  
le v ie d . Ho to p ic  in  p u b lic  fin an ce  i s  more im portan t; fo r  in  every system o f 
ta x a t io n ,  th e  c a rd in a l p o in t i s  i t s  In flu en ce  on th e  community.^®
"A word as  to  term inology. In  th e  process of ta x a tio n , we must 
d is t in g u is h  th re e  concepts. F i r s t ,  a ta x  may be imposed on some personj 
secondly , i t  may be tra n s fe r re d  by him to  a second personj th i r d ly ,  i t  may 
u ltim a te ly  be borne by t h i s  second person or t ra n s fe r re d  to  o th ers  by whom 
i t  i s  f in a l ly  assumed. Thus th e  person who o r ig in a l ly  pays th e  ta x  may no t 
be th e  one who bears i t s  burden in  th e  l a s t  in s tan ce . The process of th e  
t r a n s f e r  o f a  ta x  i s  known as th e  s h if t in g  of th e  ta x ,  w hile th e  se ttlem en t 
of th e  burden on th e  u ltim a te  taxpayer i s  c a lle d  th e  incidence o f th e  tax .-1^ -
Tax s h if t in g  tak es  p lace  through tra n sa c tio n  and changes in  p r ic e .  In  
th e  event th a t  th e  taxpayer in c reases  th e  s e l l in g  p r ic e  o f th e  goods and 
se rv ic e s  he purveys, he i s  Said to  s h i f t  th e  tax  forward in  th e  d ire c tio n  o f 
th e  u ltim a te  consumer. .In th e  case of th e  m anufacturer who buys raw m a te r ia l,  
la b o r ,  e t c . ,  i f  he can pay le s s  fo r  th e  goods and se rv ic e s  purchased, he can 
s h i f t  th e  ta x  backward to  h is  s u p p lie r s .  A th i r d  type of s h if t in g  known as 
ta x  c a p i ta l i s a t io n  occurs when th e re  i s  a tra n sa c tio n  involv ing  a long-term  
durab le  good a lre a d y  e x is t in g  as a  p a r t  o f a  s to ck  o f goods. C a p ita liz a tio n  
r e s u l t s  when th e  p resen t owner i s  fo rced  to  "absorb" th e  tax es  which th e  buyer 
o f th e  durab le  good must pay in  th e  fu tu re .  This i s  a lso  known as buying 
f re e  o f th e  ta x .
F ac to rs  to  be considered  in  analyzing  ta x  s h if t in g  a re : (a) th e  type
o f ta x  imposed; (b) co s t co n d itio n s  in  th e  in d u stry ; (c ) th e  degree of 
com petition  I n  th e  in d u stry ; (d) n a tu re  o f th e  demand fo r  th e  p roduct.
PART I I .  MEASURES OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
I f  th e  a b i l i t y  p r in c ip le  i s  to  provide a workable c r i t e r i a  fo r  
estab lishm en t and ev a lu a tio n  of ta x  s tru c tu r e s ,  s u ita b le  measures of 
a b i l i t y  or economic w ell-b e in g  must be developed. Three prim ary ones ' 
have been u t i l i s e d :  income (u su a lly  ad ju s ted  fo r  various circum stances
a f fe c t in g  expend itu res necessary  fo r  a  given s tandard  of l iv in g ) ,  personal 
w ea lth , ayid amounts sp en t, e i th e r  f o r  c e r ta in  c a teg o rie s  o f goods o r in  
t o t a l . 12
A. C urrent income a s  th e  measure.
1. Income. Income i s  g en e ra lly  regarded today as th e  b es t measure o f 
a b i l i t y ,  in  th e  sense o f economic w e ll-b e in g , s in ce  income i s  th e  prim ary 
determ inant o f th e  le v e l  o f l iv in g  which a fam ily  en joys. In  genera], income
i s  th e  amount th a t  a  fam ily  Obtains from a c t iv i ty  during a c e r ta in  perio d
f o r  consumption or sav ing . The q u a n tity  of goods persons a re  ab le  to
acq u ire  during  th e  perio d  and th e  n e t in c rease  in  savings c o n s ti tu te  th e
b e s t measure o f how w ell th e  fam ily  l iv e s  o r ,  in  o th er words, i t s  le v e l  o f 
l iv in g  during  th e  p erio d .
However, th e  a c tu a l  le v e l  of l iv in g  which can be a t ta in e d  w ith  a 
g iven amount o f money income depends in  p a r t  on c e r ta in  circum stances 
a f fe c t in g  th e  amounts th a t  a re  committed in  order to  a t t a i n  a given le v e l  
o f l iv in g .  Among th e se  f a c to rs  a re : th e  number o f persons in  th e  fam ily ,
m edical expenses, I n te r e s t  charges, e tc .  A ccordingly th e  income f ig u re  
must be a d ju s te d  fo r  th e se  f a c to rs .^ 3
2 . D e f in itio n s  o f  income. We must face now th e  ta sk  of d efin in g  
"income". "Whereas th e  word i s  w idely  used in  d iscu ss io n s  o f ju s t ic e  in  
ta x a t io n  and w ithou t ev id en t confusion , th e  g re a te s t v a r ie ty  and d is s im i la r i ty  
^appear, a s  to  both  co n ten t and phraseo logy , in  th e  a c tu a l  d e f in i t io n  proposed.
The c o n s is te n t recou rse  to  d e f in i t io n  in  term s which a re  them selves 
in d e f in a b le  (o r undefined or eq u a lly  ambiguous) t e s t i f i e s  e lo q u en tly  to  
th e  underly ing  confusion . At no p lace  in  th e  In te rn a l  Revenue Code i s  income 
sim ply d efin ed ."* ^
a . The economic d e f in a tio n . Income, as th e  economic gain  rece iv ed  
by th e  person during th e  p a r t ic u la r  period^ may be defined  as th e  a lg e b ra ic  
sum of two Item s: ( l )  th e  p erso n ’s consumption during th e  period  and (2) th e  
n e t in c rease  in  th e  in d iv id u a l’s p ersonal w ealth  during  th e  p e tio d , each 
measured in  d o l la r  term s. At th e  beginning of t h i s  period  th e  person has n e t 
perso n a l w ealth  o f a  c e r ta in  va lue . He enjoys a  c e r ta in  amount o f consumption 
during  th e  perio d ; and a t  th e  end o f th e  p e rio d , he has a  c e r ta in  f ig u re  o f 
n e t w ea lth , which may be d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  a t  th e  beginning. I f  th e re  has 
been an in c re a se , h is  t o t a l  economic gain  from th e  period  i s  measured by th e  
value o f h is  consumption during th e  perio d  p lus th e  in c rease  in  th e  vaxue o f 
h i s  w ealth . I f  h i s  n e t w ealth  has decreased , h is  n e t g a in  i s  th e  value o f h is  
w ealth ; In  th i s  case , h is  consumption has exceeded h is  Income.^5
b . The ta x  d e f in i t io n .  A ctual ta x  le g is la t io n  in  th e  U nited S ta te s  
and Canada, as  w ell as most o th er c o u n tr ie s , In te rp re ts  th e  concept o f 
Income in  term s o f flow o f w ealth—of r e c e ip t  in  money or goods—to  th e  
taxpayer during  th e  p e rio d . The *flow" method produces two prim ary 
d iffe re n c e s  in  ta x  trea tm en t from th e  "consumption p lus In crease  in  n e t 
w ealth" method:
(*l) T axation  i s  e s ta b lis h e d  on a  r e a l iz a t io n  ra th e r  th an  on an  
a c c ru ra l  b a s is .
(2) The ta x  a p p lie s  only when a  tra n s a c t io n  occurs between 
o th e r  persons and th e  tax p ay er, a s  only in  t h i s  case i s  th e re  a flow of 
w ealth  to  th e  tax p a y e r.
Expediency d ic ta te s  th e  use o f th e  "flow o f w ealth" method.1^
IT.
3. The personal income ta x . • Hie concept o f an income ta x  i s  not as 
new as most Americans th in k . A 10 percen t income ta x  was advocated in  
France by P ie r re  B o isg u ille b e r t and M arshall de Vauban in  th e  e a r ly  1700fs .
In  England i t  appeared in  th e  ta x  s tru c tu re  as e a r ly  as  th e  Napoleonic Wars 
and became a permanent p a r t  of th e  E nglish  ta x  system a f t e r  1842.
In  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  th e  f i r s t  fe d e ra l  income ta x  appeared-during 
th e  C iv il  War but i t  d id  no t become a  permanent p a r t  of th e  fe d e ra l  ta x  
s tru c tu re  u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  adoption  o f th e  l6 th  Amendment in  1913* On th e  
o th e r hand, s ta t e  income tax es  can be tra c e d  back to  th e  f a c u lty  ta x e s  in  
c o lo n ia l days. The fa c u lty  tax es  were a  d is t in c t iv e  bu t crude form of 
ta x a t io n  adapted to  th e  sim ple economic l i f e  of c o lo n ia l s o c ie ty . They were 
a  com bination o f s p e c if ic  p ro p erty  tax es  and income ta x e s .
4. Revenue produced.
a . F ed e ra l. The personal income ta x  produced $47.9  b i l l io n  in  
revenue in  1963 • This rep re sen ted  an in c rease  o f $21.2 b i l l io n  oyer th e  
1954 figure?. (See Table number I ) .  Inc lud ing  p a y ro ll ta x e s , i t  now accounts 
f o r  62 p ercen t of th e  t o t a l  f e d e ra l  ta x  revenue. This compares w ith  22 percen t 
in  th e  1930fs and 44 percen t during World War I I .  Today’s ta x  i s  h igher as  a  
percen tage o f r e a l  income than  under peak r a te s  of World War I I .
b . S ta te  and lo c a l .  P ersonal Income ta x  lawB a re  p rev a len t in  
36 s ta te s  and th e  D is t r i c t  of Columbia. Local governments in  f iv e  s ta te s  
lev y  Income ta x e s , but they  a re  w idely used in  opjLy two s t a t e s ,  Ohio and 
Pennsylvania. The t o t a l  combined s ta te  and lo c a l  government r e c e ip ts  from 
p erso n a l income tax e s  was $3,224 b i l l io n  in  1962 compared w ith  $2,153 b i l l io n  
in  1959 and $0,913  b i l l i o n  in  1952. This i s  a  $2,311 b i l l io n  in c rease  in  
J u s t  te n  sh o rt y e a rs . V irg in ia  rece iv ed  $80,405>348 in  1962 from th e  personal 
Income ta x .
5. Incidence and economic consequence o f th e  p ersonal income ta x .
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It is generally conceded that net income taxes are the most difficult to shift.
TABLE NO. I .
P erso n a l Income Tax. Amounts and as  a  percentage o f p erso n a l income anrf GNP, 
1954 _ 1963 . (B il l io n s )
yeAr NO. OF RETUktfS 
(MILLIONS)
PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX
GNP PERSONAL
INCOME
TAXES AS A 
PERCENTAGE 
OF NATIONAL 
INCOME
TAXES AS A 
PERCENTAGE0. 
OF GNP
1954 56.9 26.7 363 290 9.21 7.36
1955 58.3t 29.6 397 310 9-55 7.36
1956 59.2 32.7 t l 9 333 9.82 7.80
1957 59.8 34.4 443 351 9.80 7.76
1958 59.1 34.3 445 360 9.53 7.71
1959 60.25 38.6 483 384 10.05 7.99
i 960 61.0 39.5 503 4o i 9.85 7.85
1961 66.5 41.3 518 417 9.90 7 .97
1962 71 .0 45 .6 555 442 10.32 8 .2 2 ’
1963 71.32 kj.9 578 452 10.60 8.29
E stim ate : 
P ercen tage 
In c re a se  1954-63 19M 59.2* 55 .9i 1 5 .i!t 12,6^
Source: S t a t i s t i c s  o f Income i 960 , pp 10 0 -lO i,
S urrey  o f C urren t B usiness? J u ly  1963* p .12
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S ev era l f a c to rs  f ig u re  in  t h i s  r e s is ta n c e  to  s h if t in g :  ( l )  th e  ta x  i s
g en e ra l in  c h a ra c te r  and reasonab ly  "uniform  tre a tm e n t”: i s  g iven  to
incomes from v ario u s  sou rces; (2) i t  i s  " n e t” ta x ; i t  does not impinge
on th e  "co st o f p ro d u c tio n ” and thefefe**© i s  s e t  t e  n f f s s t
in  r e l a t iv e  s u p p lie s . However, th e re  a re  c e r ta in  economic co n d itio n s  under which
th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f s h if t in g  a n e t income ta x  w i l l  occur. S h if t in g  o f th e
ta x  may occur i f  th e  ta x  produces changes in  th e  q u a n t i t ie s  o f v arious f a c to rs
a v a i la b le .  I f  th e  q u a n tity  of lab o r  f a l l s ,  wages w i l l  r i s e  and p a r t  o f th e
ta x  i s  s h if te d  to  business  owners. This in c rea se s  th e  "co st of production"
and w i l l  le a d  to  upward ad justm ents in  p r ic e s .  As a  consequence, th e  ta x  in
p a r t  s h i f t s  forward onto persons in  t h e i r  c a p a c ity  as consumers. The
d i f f e r e n t  types o f lab o r su p p lied  com plicate th e  p ic tu re  o f in c id en ce . S im ila r
in flu e n c e s  a f f e c t  th e  p r ic e  o f money c a p i ta l .  I f  th e  t o t a l  supply i s  reduced ,
th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  and th e  earn ings on eq u ity  c a p i ta l  w i l l  tend  to  r i s e . .
However, t h i s  can be countered  by th e  c e n tra l  bank p o l i c y .^
6 . C o n c lu s io n s .T h e  p erso n a l income ta x  i s  g e n e ra lly  regarded  as  th e
most e q u ita b le  means o f d is t r ib u t in g  th e  burden of th e  c o s ts  of government.
I t s  burden I s  c o r re la te d  w ith  economic w ell-b e in g  more s a t i s f a c to r i l y  th an
th a t  o f  any o th e r ta x .  Not only I s  th e  ta x  based d i r e c t ly  upon Income, th e
prim ary determ inant o f economic w e ll-b e in g , but i t  can be defined  in  term s
o f  fam ily  s iz e ,  m edical expenses, and o th e r co n s id e ra tio n s  a f fe c t in g  th e
le v e l  o f l iv in g  which may be enjoyed w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  income. The degree
o f  p ro g ress io n  must always be based on consensus o f a t t i tu d e s  o f so c ie ty  
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on e q u ity  in  th e  d is t r ib u t io n  of income.
From a  p r a c t ic a l  s ta n d p o in t, th e  most se rio u s  l im i ta t io n  to  th e  
ta x  i s  th e  in a b i l i ty  to  p reven t some evasion  on th e  p a r t  o f c e r ta in  groups 
o f economy. From th e  s tan d p o in t o f economic e f f e c t s ,  th e  c h ie f  danger i s  
th a t  of adverse  e f f e c ts  upon in c e n tiv e s , p a r t ic u la r ly  to  develop and expand 
b u s in ess  and to  ta k e  more re sp o n s ib le  p o s itio n s*  The p re sen t f e d e ra l  income
ta x  s tru c tu r e  co n ta in s  unnecessary loopholes* which c re a te  in eq u ity  and 
le s s e n  th e  degree of e f fe c t iv e  p ro g ress io n . On th e  o th e r hand, some o f# 
th e se  loopholes probably le s s e n  th e  adverse economic e f f e c ts  o f th e  ta x .
B. P ersonal w ealth  as  a m easure,
1 . W ealth. An a l te r n a t iv e  measure of economic w e ll-b e in g  i s  p e rso n a l 
w ea lth , ,in  th e  sense of th e  value o f goods, c la im s, and p ro p erty  r ig h ts  
owned. This measure i s  no t a flow during a p a r t ic u la r  p erio d  bu t th e  
value  o f a  s to ck  o f w ealth  o f a  person a t  a  p a r t ic u la r  p erio d  but th e  
value o f a  stock  of w ealth  o f a person a t  a p a r t ic u la r  moment o f tim e. To 
th e  e x te n t th a t  t h i s  w ealth  i s  p laced  in  incom e-yield ing  investm ents, th e  
w ea lth  i s  in  p a r t  r e f le c te d  in  income. But n e v e r th e le s s , i f  two persons 
have th e  same income and a re  in  o therw ise s im ila r  circum stances bu t h av e ' 
d i f f e r e n t  amounts of w ea lth , they  a re  not eq u a lly  w ell o f f .  The person  
w ith  w ealth  i s  no t under th e  same compulsion to  save as  i s  th e  person w ith ­
o u t. The person who has l i t t l e  w ealth  must save in  o rder to  a t t a in  th e  
Same degree o f s e c u r ity  a g a in s t r i s k  as th e  o th er person  and th e re fo re  
cannot enjoy th e  same c u rre n t le v e l o f consumption. Furtherm ore, th e  person 
w ith  w ealth  may, i f  he chooses, spend a p o r tio n  o f t h i s  w ealth  each year 
to  m ain ta in  a  h ig h er le v e l  o f l iv in g  th an  th a t  which th e  person w ithout 
w ealth  can a t t a i n .  The problem i s  much th e  same i f  th e  person w ith  w ealth  
has in v ested  i t  in  durab le  consumption goods, p a r t ic u la r ly  a home. L o g ica lly  
th e  r e n ta l  value o f th e  home should be included  in  ta x a b le  income, but in  
p ra c t ic e  i t  i s  n e t .  A ccordingly , i f  income alone i s  used as  th e  measure o f
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a b i l i t y ,  th e  person who has such w ealth  e s s e n t ia l ly  enjoys some ta x - f r e e  
income, s in c e  he avoids th e  heavy r e n ta l  payments of th e  person who has not 
y e t acq u ired  h is  home, and he lik ew ise  i s  no t under th e  same o b lig a tio n  to  
accum ulate a  reserve.^-®
2 . P roperty  ta x .  T axation of w ealth  has p layed a  major r o le  in  th e  
* *
o v e ra l l  ta x  s t r u c tu r e s  o f  th e  U nited  S ta te s  s in ce  c o lo n ia l  days. The
21 .
ta x e s ,  however, have not been imposed on th e  n e t p e rso n a l w ealth  of 
in d iv id u a ls  but on a l l  p ro p e rty , or c e r ta in  types o f p ro p e rty , re g a rd le s s  
o f  ow nership, and on g ro ss  value w ithou t deduction  o f any claim s o u tstan d in g . 
There a re  91,236  governments in  th e  U nited S ta te s  of which 91,235 may lev y  
p ro p e rty  t a x e s . ^9 These a re  composed o f:
F ed era l 1
S ta te  50
M unicipal 17,997
Township 17,144
School D is t r i c t  34,678
S p ec ia l D is t r i c t  18,323
a .  F ed era l government and p ro p erty  ta x . Because of th e  c o n s t i t«. 
u t io n a l  p ro v is io n  th a t  a l l  f e d e ra l  " d ire c t  ta x e s ” must be apportioned  among 
th e  s ta t e s  accord ing  to  p o p u la tio n , th e  fe d e ra l  government has never u t i l i z e d  
th e  p ro p e rty  ta x  very e x te n s iv e ly . I t  a ttem pted  to  do so s e v e ra l tim es 
d u ring  th e  19t h  Century bu t was never su c ce ss fu l in  th e  a c tu a l  c o l le c t io n  o f 
revenue. The p ro p erty  ta x , th e re fo re ,  i s  p r a c t ic a l ly  o f no f i s c a l  
S ig n if ic a n c e  to  th a t  u n i t  o f government.
b. S ta te  government and p ro p erty  ta x . S ince th e  c lo se  of th e  l a s t  
c e n tu ry , p ro p erty  ta x  revenues have been o f a  d ec lin in g  s ig n if ic a n c e  to  
s t a t e  governments a ls o .  There has been a conscience e f f o r t  on th e  p a r t  o f 
s t a t e  governments to  withdraw from th e  p ro p erty  ta x  f i e ld .  In  1900 over
50 p e rcen t o f a l l  s ta t e  ta x  revenue came from t h i s  source . In  1948, only one 
s t a t e ,  N ebraska, rece iv ed  over 20 p ercen t o f i t s  ta x  revenue from th i s  so u rce . 
In  i 960, only th re e  s ta t e s  rece iv ed  more th an  10 p ercen t o f t h e i r  t o t a l  ta x  
revenue from p ro p erty  ta x e s : N ebraska, 29*91»> A rizona, 17*3$; and Wyoming,
16 ,3 i>. Three s ta te s  do n o t lev y  p ro p e rty  ta x e s : Oklahoma, Rhode I s la n d ,
and Tennessee. In  1961 only  3*3 p ercen t o f  t o t a l  s ta te  ta x  r e c e ip ts  was 
from  p ro p e rty  ta x e s . (See Table number 2*) S ta te  a sse ssed  p ro p erty  fo r  th e  
y ea r 1963 amounted to  $27-8 b i l l i o n .  V irg in ia  c o lle c te d  $197,347,266 in  1961
22 .
from an a sse sse d  p ro p erty  base o f alm ost $7 b i l l io n  which was p ercen t 
o f  a l l  ta x  c o l le c t io n s .
c .  Local p ro p erty  ta x e s .  P ro p erty  tax es  a re  th e  very substance 
o f lo e a l  ta x  s t r u c tu r e s « She lo c a l  w a its  a re  a # t sQ variga aad t tm a tm m  
can only lev y  such tax es  as they  a re  p erm itted  by th e  s ta t e .  A ll  s t a t e s  
ha we p e rm itted  th e  lo c a l  u n i ts  a good dea l o f l a t i tu d e  in  levy ing  
p ro p e rty  ta x e s . Only f iv e  s ta te  c o n s ti tu t io n s  l im i t  th e  o v e ra ll  p ro p erty  
ta x in g  power w hile  s ta tu te s  l im i t  th e  power in  fo u r o th e r  s ta t e s .  S ix teen  
s t a t e  c o n s t i tu t io n s  p lace  s p e c if ic  l im i ts  on th e  l o c a l i t i e s  ta x in g  power 
w h ile  s ta tu te s  in  l6  o th e r s ta te s  l im i t  th e  power. The revenues o f lo c a l  
governments f o r  g en e ra l government purposed to ta le d  $32.9  b i l l i o n  in  i 960 .
The corresponding  t o t a l  was $21 b i l l i o n  f iv e  years e a r l i e r ,  $ l4  b i l l i o n  in  
1950> and about $7 b i l l i o n  during  th e  years  of World War I I .  Local 
governments r a i s e  about 70 p e rcen t o f t h e i r  c u rre n t revenues from th e i r  own 
so u rces . A pproxim ately 30 p e rcen t o f th e  c u rre n t revenue o f lo c a l  governments 
i s  s t a t e  and F ed era l a id ,  c h ie f ly  s t a t e .  S ta te  a id  in c lu d e s , of co u rse , some 
f \ands which o r ig in a te d  in  F ed era l a id  to  s ta t e s .  (See Table number 3 -)
Many fu n c tio n s  o f c i v i l  governments a re  t r a d i t io n a l ly  lo c a l  
and t h e i r  c o s t has outpaced th e  yOfcLd of lo c a l  government’s own revenue 
so u rc e s . D esp ite  s u b s ta n t ia l  in c re a se s  in  th e  amount o f s ta t e  and F ed era l 
a id ,  many c i t i e s ,  c o u n tie s , and school d i s t r i c t s ,  have been a b le  to  fin an ce  
t h e i r  burgeton ing  a c t i v i t i e s  only by reco u rse  to  tax es  no t w e ll s u ite d  fo r  
lo c a l  u se . The revenue requ irem ents of lo c a l  governments w i l l  con tinue 
to  mount a s  th e  q u a n tity  and q u a l i ty  o f t h e i r  programs a re  brought in to  
b e t t e r  conform ity  w ith  th e  fu r th e r  growth and u rb a n iz a tio n  of th e  
p o p u la tio n  and w ith  r i s in g  l iv in g  s tan d a rd s . S ig n if ic a n t  ad justm en ts in  
S ta te - lo c a l  f i s c a l  r e la t io n s  w i l l  be re q u ire d  to  p rev en t th e  ag g rav a tio n  o f 
d i s p a r i t i e s  between lo c a l  needs and lo c a l  re so u rc e s .
TABLE HUMBER 2 .
S ta te  ta x  c o lle c t io n * , by so u rce , s e le c te d  y e a rs , 1902 -  1962.
(M illio n s  Of D o lla rs)
TEAR TOTAL
EXCLUDING
EMPLOYMENT
INDIVIDUAL
INCOME
TAX
percent
OF
TOTAL
PROPERTY
TAX
PERCENT
OF
TOTAL
1902
1913
1922
1932
1942
1952
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
$156
301
947
1890
3903
9857
13375
14531
14919
15848
18036
19002
20600
43
74
913
1374
1563
1544
1764
2209
2353
2730
... 4 .5  
3*9 
6*4 
9 .3
10.3  
10.8
10.3
11.1
12.2
12.4
13.3
$:-82
140
348
328
264
370
4$7 
479 
533 
5 66 
607 
631
52.6  
46 .5
36.7 
17.3
6 .8
3 .7
3 .5
3 .5  
3 .3 .
3 .6  
3 .4  
3 .3
n o t a v a ila b le  n o t a v a ila b le
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3. S h if t in g  and inc idence of p ro p erty  ta x e s . The a n a ly s is  o f s h i f t in g  
o f th e  p ro p erty  ta x  must be made in  term s o f th e  various c la s se s  of 
p ro p e rty  which a re  su b jec t to  th e  ta x .  No o v e ra ll  g e n e ra liz a tio n s  a re  
p o s s ib le ,  because th e  s h if t in g  o f some p o rtio n s  w i l l  d i f f e r  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  
from th a t  of o th e rs .^ 0
a . Land ta x e s . In  th e  usual d iscu ss io n  o f lan d  i t  i s  contended 
th a t  because th e  supply of land  i s  r e l a t iv e ly  f ix e d  s h if t in g  i s  no t l ik e ly  
to  occur except in  th e  form of ta x  c a p i ta l i z a t io n . Land re c e iv e s  an 
income c a l le d  r e n t ,  and i f  th e  supply o f land  vh ich  i s  a c tu a lly  used can 
be shown t o  vary  w ith  th e  amount o f ta x ,  a ta x  on lan d  could be s h if te d .
Upon th e  s a le  o f land  a  form o f s h if t in g  known as ta x  c a p i ta l iz a t io n  ten d s
to  ta k e  p la c e . The p ro sp ec tiv e  buyer ten d s  to  d iscoun t th e  fu tu re  
a n t ic ip a te d  ta x e s  which reduce th e  income from la n d , and so they  o f fe r  a 
low er p r ic e  fo r  th e  la n d , th u s  fo rc in g  th e  s e l l e r  to  absorb fu tu re  ta x e s .
b . B uild ing  ta x e s . I f  a p ro p erty  ta x  i s  le v ie d  on an owner 
occupied b u ild in g , th e re  i s  l i t t l e  he can do to  avoid  bearin g  th e  burden 
excep t to  keep down th e  assessed  v a lu a tio n . On r e n ta l  b u ild in g s  i f  
income iB reduced i t  w i l l  ten d  to  curb c o n s tru c tio n  o f a d d it io n a l r e n ta l  
u n i t s .  However, in  a perio d  o f s te a d ily  expanding popu la tio n  th e  demand 
f o r  housing may in c re a se . Under those  circum stances la n d lo rd s  may be
a b le  to  r a i s e  r e n ts  and th u s  s h i f t  p ro p erty  ta x e s . Another way owner s^ re a c t 
w ith  advent of h ig h er tax es  i f  to  postpone upkeep and r e p a ir s .
c . Business in v e n to r ie s . I f  th e  ta x  i s  permanent and i s  le v ie d
*
on a l l  co m p e tito rs , th e re  i s  a l ik e lih o o d  th a t  i t  w i l l  be s h if te d . The 
ta x  becomes a  co s t o f doing business and i s  tacked  on to  th e  p r ic e .
d. In ta n g ib le  p ro p e rty . Here th e  usual experience i s  th a t  a  la rg e  
f r a c t io n  o f th e  p ro p erty  evades th e  ta x .  I f  ta x in g  i s  su cc e ss fu l s h if t in g  
ecan occur only through a  change in  th e  p r ic e  o f th e  in ta n g ib le  o r in  a  
change r e tu rn  upon I t .
k .  E ffe c ts  o f th e  p ro p erty  ta x  and i t s  s h if t in g .  The p ro p erty  ta x  
and i t s  inc idence have had some adverse e f f e c ts  upon th e  co n s tru c tio n  
o f  r e n ta l  housing and e s p e c ia l ly  low -cost housing fo r  th e  low income people. 
The ta x  has caused a  good deal of m igration  o f c i t iz e n s  away from th e  
c i t i e s  and has m otivated th e  estab lishm en t of ta x  co lo n ies  in  suburban 
a re a s . I t  has s tim u la ted  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f sm aller houses and b u ild in g s . 
Tax c a p i ta l iz a t io n  has had th e  tendency to  depress r e a l  e s ta te  v a lu es , and 
th u s  i t  has d iscouraged investm ent in  r e a l  e s ta te .  In  g e n e ra l, th e  tax es  
on business seem to  be more s h if ta b le  th an  those  which f a l l  upon th e  
u ltim a te  u ser or consumer. Taxes on b u ild in g s  and improvements appear 
to  be more e a s i ly  s h if te d  th a n  ta x e s  on land ; F in a l ly ,  th e  more u n iv e rsa l 
and uniform the impact of the tax on various classes of property, the more 
l ik e ly  It i s  to be s h if te d .
PART I I I .  CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES AS A MEASURE.
A. Theory. A major a l te r n a t iv e  to  income as  th e  b a s is  fo r  ta x a tio n  i s  
consumption ex p en d itu res . D esp ite  th e  g en era l acceptance of income as  th e  
most s u ita b le  measure o f economic w e ll-b e in g , s u b s ta n tia l  use has been made 
o f  th e  expend itu re  base as w e ll ,  and arguments have o f te n  been advanced 
fo r  in c re a se d , or even e x c lu s iv e , r e l ia n c e  upon t h i s  b a s is  in  p re fe ren ce  
to  income. In  term s o f th e  basic  d e f in i t io n  of income (consumption p lus 
in c re a se  in  n e t w e a lth ) , a  consumption based ta x  would apply  only to  one 
segment o f t o t a l  income, namely, consumption, w hile in c reases  in  n e t w ealth  
would be excluded from th e  base of the  ta x . In  term s of th e  "flow of w ealth” 
d e f in i t io n  o f income employed In  th e  ta x  law s, only th e  p o r tio n  of th e  flow 
employed for consumption purposed would be taxed . For persons who a re  
spending more th a n  t h e i r  incomes, th e  p o te n t ia l  ta x  base i s  g re a te r  under 
th e  expend itu re  approach th a n  under th e  income approach.
1 . Income defined  as consumption. "A group o f w r i te r s  over a long 
p e rio d  o f tim e has argued th a t  Income Is  a p p ro p ria te ly  defined  fo r  
ta x  purposes as c o n s is tin g  only of consumption ex p en d itu res , because 
economic w e ll-b e in g  i s  determ ined by consumption a lo n e . The c h ie f  
exponent of t h i s  d o c tr in e  in  l a t e r  years was Irv in g  F is h e r ,  bu t th e  
id  lea i s  to  found in  e a r l i e r  w r i t in g s .  C la s s ic a l  econom ists such as  
Jc«hn M ill and PIgou follow ed a s im ila r  l in e  of reason ing  in  argu ing  th a t  
th  e  ta x a t io n  o f both th e  p o r tio n  o f income saved and th e  subsequent earn ings 
f r  om th e  sums saved c o n s ti tu te d  double ta x a t io n , s in ce  th e  p r in c ip a l i s  
r e d u c e d  by th e  amount o f th e  ta x ,  and then  th e  e a rn in g s . This te rm in o lo g ica l 
£ tpproach i s  no t p a r t ic u la r ly  f r u i t f u l .  The d e f in i t io n  o f income which in c lu d es  
sums saved as w ell as sums consumed i s  more g e n e ra lly  accep ted , in  l in e  w ith
26  A
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th e  p o in t o f view th a t  saving a  p o r tio n  of income c o n s t i tu te s  a c o n tr ib u tio n  
to  th e  p erson !s  economic w e ll-b e in g  and r e f l e c t s  a  d e lib e ra te  choW ? . . . .  
th e  argument over th e  d e s i r a b i l i ty  o f excluding  saving  from th e  base o f 
ta x a t io n  ean be re so lv ed  only in  term s of th e  m erits  and l im i ta t io n  o f 
doing so , no t by la b e lin g  th e  f a i lu r e  to  do so as  "double t a x a t i o n " .^
2 . E quity  and th e  consumption ta x .  The key argument on eq u ity  grounds 
fo r  th e  expend itu re  b a s is  d a tes  back se v e ra l c e n tu r ie s  to  th e  sta tem ent 
o f Hobbes th a t  eq u ity  re q u ire s  th e  ta x a tio n  of persons on th e  b a s is  
o f  what th ey  ta k e  out o f th e  common pool (N ational p roduct) r a th e r  than  
what th ey  pu t in to  i t .  " . . . t h e  E q u a lity  o f Im position  c o n s is te th  r a th e r  in  
th e  E q u a lity  o f th a t  which i s  consumed, r a th e r  th an  of th e  r ic h e s  o f th e  
persons th a t  consume th e  sam e."^3 a p e rso n 's  d i r e c t  and immediate le v e l 
Of l iv in g  depends upon h is  consumption ex p en d itu res; when he saves now and 
consumes l a t e r ,  he w i l l  be caught a t  th e  tim e o f u ltim a te  consumption. I f  a  
person  c u r re n tly  consumes from p rev io u sly  accum ulated o r in h e r ite d  sav in g s , ' 
e q u ity  re q u ire s  th a t  he make some c u rre n t c o n tr ib u tio n  to  government on th e  
b a s is  o f t h i s  ex p en d itu re , e s p e c ia l ly  in  p erio d s  o f  severe sho rtag es  and 
in f la t io n a r y  p re ssu re s .
The Income ta x  ignores th e  d i f f e r e n t  spending ca p ac ity  o f v arious 
incomes; spending c a p a c ity , r a th e r  th an  income, i s  th e  b e s t measure of 
ta x  paying a b i l i t y .  The d iffe re n c e s  a r i s e  in  p a r t  out of th e  vary ing  w ealth  
s ta tu s  o f th e  r e c ip ie n ts .  A person who has not y e t accum ulated and must 
p u t some o f h is# income a s id e  does no t have th e  same consumption power as 
an o th e r person w ith  th e  same income who has a lread y  accum ulated. Thus, 
income ta x a t io n  ten d s  to  d isc r im in a te  a g a in s t persons ga in ing  th e i r  incomes -1  
p r im a r ily  from wages compared to  th o se  ga in ing  them from a lread y  accum ulated 
sav in g s . T his d isc r im in a tio n  can be o f f s e t  in  various ways, but w ith  th e  
ex p en d itu re  b a s is ,  I t  does n o t a r i s e  a t  a l l .  In  g e n e ra l ,  under th e  expenditu re
28.
b a s is ,  no attem pt i s  necessary  to  a d ju s t  fo r  th e  Varying degrees o f spending 
power, s in ce  th e se  a re  au to m a tic a lly  r e f le c te d  in  th e  expend itu res which 
persons a c tu a l ly  make.
3. Savings and th e  consumption ta x .  F u rth e r defense fo r  th e  expenditu res
1
b a s is  i s  b u i l t  on th e  argument th a t  income ta x e s ,  by reducing  th e  n e t income 
from sav in g s , d i s to r t  th e  choice of th e  in d iv id u a l between p resen t and 
fu tu re  consumption, by making th e  l a t t e r  le s s  a t t r a c t iv e  th an  i t  would 
o therw ise be. Persons a re  given added in c en tiv e  to  consume now. Kalder 
a rgues th a t  th e  h ig h er income groups in  G reat B r i ta in  have ceased to  save 
because of th e  p re se n t p ro g ress iv e  income ta x  tre a tm e n t. "That th e  w ealthy 
c la s s e s  in  B r i ta in  have ceased to  save and dis-Bave on a co n sid e rab le  s c a le —  
a t  l e a s t  in  r e l a t io n  to  t h e i r  taxed  incomes— is  n o t,  I  th in k  S erio u s ly  co n tes ted  
by anybody: The s t a t i s t i c s  o f n e t incomes a f t e r  ta x  a lre a d y  re fe r re d  to
pji
p rov ide  s u f f ic ie n t  evidence o f t h i s .
By c o n tr a s t ,  th e  expend itu res  b a s is  would e lim in a te  t h i s  b ia s ,  and 
even re v e rse  i t  i f  persons b e liev ed  th e  ta x  to  be tem porary or d iscoun t 
fu tu re  ta x  payments. A part from th ese  in ce n tiv e  e f f e c t s ,  an expenditu re  ta x ,  
e s p e c ia l ly  one imposing s u b s ta n tia l  burden on th e  lower income groups, tends 
to  reduce consumption to  a g re a te r  e x te n t th an  th e  income ta x  by co n cen tra tin g  
i t s  burdens on persons who must reduce consumption because they  have 
inadequate savings margins from which to  absorb th e  ta x .
V. E ffe c ts  on In c e n tiv e s .
a .  R isk . B is t in c f t  from th e  q u es tio n  Of r e l a t iv e  e f f e c ts  o f th e
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ex p en d itu res  b a s is  upon th e  In cen tiv es  to  save Is  th a t  o f th e  r e l a t iv e  
e f f e c t s ,  compared to  th e  income b a s is ,  on th e  in c e n tiv e s  to  undertake 
investm ent and to  tak e  r i s k s  in  a  broad sen se . The income b a s is ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  
w ith  p re se n t p ro g re ss io n , n o t only  ta k e s  away a  s u b s ta n t ia l  p o r tio n  o f th e
incomes o f co rp o ra tio n s  and w e a lth ie r  persons who a re  in  a p o s it io n  
to  undertake th e  r i s k s  o f busin ess  development, bu t a lso  reduces th e  
In ce n tiv e  to  do so , s in ce  th e  government w i l l  absorb most o f  th e  
p o ss ib le  g a in s . The expend itu re  b a s is ,  which does not apply  to  earn ings 
so  long as  they  a re  saved and used fo r  f u r th e r  b usiness  expansion o r o th e r 
purposes, avoids th e  ex cessiv e  d ra in in g  o f savings away from in v e s tin g  
groups and th e  in c e n tiv e  p e n a l t i e s .^5
b . Work. The expend itu re  base may have le s s  severe  e f f e c ts  
upon work in c e n tiv e s  th an  th e  income base , s in ce  th e  tax es  imposed 
upon th e  form er can be escaped , a t  l e a s t  tem p o ra rily , by sav ing , 
whereas th e  tax e s  based upon Income cannot be. The use of th e  ex p en d itu res  
ta x  e x c lu s iv e ly  would perm it e lim in a tio n  o f the  co rp o ra te  ta x .  Ho 
consumption occurs a t  th e  c o rp o ra te  le v e l .  No e f f o r t  would be re q u ire d  to  
d is t in g u is h  among various c a p i ta l  gains to  determ ine which ones c o n s t i tu te  
Income, s in c e  to  th e  e x te n t th a t  th e  r e c ip ie n ts  regarded  them as  incomsand 
sp en t th e  sums, th ey  would be reached by th e  t a x .
5. Arguments f o r  consumption le v ie s .  S evera l major arguments have 
been p re sen ted  by th o se  fav o rin g  consumption ta x e s .
a .  Consumption tax e s  a re  adequate and th e  revenue flow s im m ediately. 
Consumption ta x e s ,  w hile  no t t o t a l l y  adequate , p rovide a  s u b s ta n t ia l  amount 
o f needed revenue an n u a lly  and to  d ispense  w ith  t h i s  revenue v eh ic le  would 
r e s u l t  in  a  s h i f t  in  th e  ta x  burden to  ano ther income r a is in g  source.
b. They a re  e a s i ly  ad ap tab le  fo r  sumptuary c o n tro l.  This argument 
i s  c le a r ly  an e th ic a l  p roposa l and must be based on th e  assum ption th a t  a  
community i s  in  s u b s ta n t ia l  u n ity  upon th o se  goods which a re  considered  
"harm ful". I t  a ls o  assumes th a t  th e  im position  w i l l  a u to m a tic a lly  d ecrease  
th e  use o f  th e .h a rm fu l p ro d u c t.
c . They provide a  r e l a t iv e ly  s ta b le  source o f revenue over th e  
b usin ess  c y c le . The income ta x  i s  s e n s i t iv e  to  cyc les  and th e  government 
lo s e s  much needed revenues during  dep ressions w hile consumption expend itu res 
a re  s ta b le  over th e  cy c le  causing  th e  government to  have a  s tead y  supply o f  
fu n d s .
d . Consumption tax es  a re  a lso  defended on th e  ground th a t  they  
make everybody c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  government. Everyone should c o n tr ib u te , 
i t  i s  s a id ,  f i r s t ,  because everyone re c e iv e s  some b e n e f its  from th e  
government and second, because i t  w i l l  tend  to  make everybody in te re s te d
in  th e  government and le s s  l ik e ly  to  support ex travagan t p u b lic  ex p en d itu res. 
Where a  few people pay a l l  th e  ta x e s  and, th e  masses enjoy th e  b e n e f its  of 
governm ent, th e  many a re  l ik e ly  to  e x p lo it  th e  few by vo ting  fo r  every new 
bond is su e  and p u b lic  s e rv ic e . On th e  o th e r hand, consumption ta x e s  a re  
poor p ro te c tio n  from governm ental ex travagance. The c o r re la t io n  i f  any 
between b e n e f its  and consumption i s  weak, and th e  im position  o f consumption 
ta x e s  upon even th o se  who a re  r e c ip ie n ts  o f  r e l i e f  would be l ik e  charging th e  
inm ates r e n t  a t  a  poor house,
e . They promote ta x  consciousness. They im press on th e  g re a te s t  
S in g le  " c la ss "  in  s o c ie ty —th e  consum er--the n e c e s s ity  o f tem pering i t ’s  
demand fo r  government s e rv ic e s . C r i t i c s  say th a t  many o f th e  ta x e s  a re  
h idden  and c re a te  no ta x  consciousness. A p o ll  ta x  in  making people ta x  
conscious would be much more e f f e c t iv e .
f . They a re  economical to  c o l le c t  and convienent to  pay. This 
adheres to  Adam Sm ith’s canon th a t  a l l  tax es  should be convenient to  pay.
g . They a r e  d e s ira b le  because th ey  o f f s e t  o th e r  ta x  burdens and, 
th e r e f o r e ,  sp read  th e  t o t a l  c o s ts  o f  government over a  w ider range o f in d iv id u a l 
ta x p a y e rs . They a re  s a id  to  o f f s e t  th e  p ro g ressiv e  income and in h e r ita n c e  
ta x e s .  I n  a d d it io n , one h e a rs , a t  th e  lo c a l  l e v e l ,  th e  c ry  t h a t  in creased
ta x e s  on p ro p erty  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  ta x  d e lin q u en c ie s , "property-ow ner B tr ik e s” 
and so on; th e  b e s t way to  p reven t such occurrences i s  to  i n i t i a t e  new or 
in c re a se  o ld  consumption le v ie s  to  cover proposed governmental e x p e n s e s .^
6 . Arguments a g a in s t consumption le v ie s .  Arguments here a re  broken 
in to  two major c la s s i f ic a t io n s :  ( l )  th o se  of sp e c ia l s ig n if ic a n c e  to  th e
In d iv id u a l,  and (2) those  which a f f e c t  th e  economy as a  whole,
a .  From th e  view point o f th e  in d iv id u a l,
(1) Upside down ta x e s . The consumption tax es  have been c a l le d  
"upside-down income tax es"  and ta x e s  th a t  a re  based upon th e  " in a b i l i ty  to  
r e s i s t "  r a th e r  than  th e  a b i l i t y  to  pay.
(2) R egressive in  e f f e c t .  Consumption ta x e s , i t  i s  argued, 
a r e  uniform  in  r a te  upon a l l .  They h i t  th e  lower income groups h a rd e s t in  
t h a t  th ey  tak e  from th&m a la rg e r  percen tage of t h e i r  income th an  from th e  
w ealthy . Those w ith  sm all incomes spend p r a c t ic a l ly  a l l  o f t h e i r  earn ings 
m ostly fo r  commodities which a re  purchased a t  th e  r e t a i l  s to r e s .  On th e  
Other hand, th e  r e c ip ie n t  o f a  $1,000,000 Income does, s o t  spend a l l  th a t  he 
re c e iv e s ;  most o f h is  income more or le s s  au to m a tica lly  goes in to  savings w hile  
an o th e r s u b s ta n t ia l  p a r t  i s  spen t fo r  s e rv ic e s .
( 3 ) A b il i ty  to  pay d isreg a rd ed . These tax es  make no adjustm ents
f o r  th e  consumer’s a b i l i t y  to  pay. They ta k e  no account o f dependents and o th e r 
"need" f a c to r s  such a s  i l l n e s s  and education . Nor do they  g ive any c o n s id e ra tio n  
to  th e  unemployed; in  f a c t  th e se  tax es  embezzle away p a r t  of th e  unemployed
a llow ances. These tax es  tak e  away from th e  poor man th e  d o lla rs  which have a
h ig h  u t i l i t y  to  him. They p lace  upon him a  maximum s a c r i f ic e .
( t )  Pyramiding. One o f th e  more su b tle  fe a tu re s  o f a consumption 
ta x  i s  I t s  tendency to  tak e  more from th e  pockets o f th e  taxpayers  th an  
th e  government in ten d s  o r  re c e iv e s . Pyramiding occurs p a r t ic u la r ly  i n  
connection  w ith  m an ufac tu rers’ s a le s  ta x e s  and g en era l s a le s  ta x e s . While
a  product i s  p assin g  from th e  raw m a te r ia l to  th e  f in is h e d  s tag e  and 
th rough  th e  hands o f various d i s t r ib u to r s  to  th e  u ltim a te  consumer, 
s e v e ra l  s a le s  may be involved befo re  i t  reaches i t s  journeys end. S ince 
th e  value of th e  commodity in c reases  as  i t  approaches th e  consumer, th e  
percen tage ta x  adds an ev e r-in c re a s in g  burden which i s  compounded w ith  
each  s a le .  And In  a d d it io n , p r o f i t  mark-ups a re  c a lc u la te d  on th e  b a s is
oAo f  th e  compounded ta x  c o s ts .
b. From th e  p o in t o f view o f th e  economy as a  whole. These 
ta x e s  can a f f e c t  th e  o v e ra ll  o p e ra tio n  o f th e  economic system.
(1) D eplete o v e ra ll  purchasing  power. Consumption tax e s  
S tr ik e  a t  a  s t r a te g ic  p o in t in  th a t  they  ap p ro p ria te  purchasing  power 
from th o se  who would o rd in a r i ly  spend I t  f o r  p r iv a te  consumption.
Whenever consumption le v ie s  s u b tra c t  from th e  t o t a l  purchasing  power o f  a  
community, th e  e f f e c t iv e  demand fo r  goods i s  decreased , u n less  th e  
ex p en d itu res  by th e  government a re  re tu rn e d  to  consumers In  th e  same 
p ro p o rtio n  a s  tax ed . The preponderent m ajo rity  o f governmental 
ex p en d itu re s  a re  r e d ire c te d  in to  th e  economy, bu t th e re  i s  no planned
re-apportionm ent along consumers1 l in e s .  Thus low-income groups s u f fe r  a  
d i r e c t ,  immediate lo s s ,  w ith  only a  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  th ey  w i l l  recoup a  
p o r tio n  o f  th e  ta x  by an in d i r e c t ,  remote ex p en d itu re .
(2) C u r ta i l  employment and investm ent. Whenever th e re  i s  a  
re d u c tio n  in  t o t a l  e f f e c t iv e  demand in  an economy, s e l l e r s  o f goods a re  
th e  f i r s t  to  re c e iv e  th e  im pact. S a les  d ec rease , in v e n to rie s  accum ulate, 
and t o t a l  r e c e ip ts  d e c lin e . This i s  tu rn ed  back on th e  p roducer, fo r  he 
must a d ju s t  h is  o u tp u t to  e q u i l ib ra te  th e  volume so ld . The producer
may be fo rced  to  re a p p o rtio n  h is  p roduction  of goods and a l lo c a te  h is  
re so u rc e s  in to  d i f f e r e n t  combinations* Consumption le v ie s  which c u r t a i l
p roduction  fo rce  the, la y -o f f  o f employees. This in  tu rn  fo rc e s  a d d itio n a l 
decrease in  t o t a l  purchasing  power and e f fe c t iv e  demand. In v e s to rs , s iz in g  
up th e  p o ss ib le  markets fo r  t h e i r  funds, keep a c lo se  eye on t o t a l  r e c e ip ts  
and p r o f i t  margins o f d i f f e r e n t  in d u s t r ie s ,  and i f  t h e i r  outlook i s  
dampened by th e  decreased demand, th ey  w i l l  w i^kold funds from investm ent.
(3) C y c lic a lly  r ig id .  This argument c o n tra d ic ts  th e  s t a b i l i t y  
th eo ry  o f  th e  t a x ’s proponents. Taxes which run counterclockw ise to  th e  
cy c le  produce r i g i d i t i e s  in  p r ic e  v a r ia t io n s .  A consumption ta x  may be only 
nominal a t  in f la te d  wages and p r ic e s  in  p ro s p e r i ty ,  but i t  w i l l  be burdensome 
during  th e  d e f la te d  co n d itio n s  o f a  d ep ress io n . In  a d d it io n , consumption 
le v ie s  may have l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on c u r ta i l in g  p r ic e  r i s e s  during  booms, but 
th e y  may serve  as an anchor on busin ess  expansion a t  th e  c y c l ic a l  tro u g h .
(h) A ffec t b usiness  methods. They ten d  to  e lim in a te  th e  
middleman by fo s te r in g  th e  growth o f la r g e ,  m u ltip le  p rocess es tab lishm en ts  
a t  th e  expense o f sm aller concerns. They ten d  toward th e  In te g ra tio n  o f 
busin ess  f irm s , th e  s u b s t i tu t io n  o f  b rokers fo r  w h o le sa le rs , th e  ex tension  
o f  s e l l in g  on consignment and o th er changes in  business s tru c tu r e s  in  o rder 
to  avo id  th e  ta x .
(5) Tennis to  in ju re  sm all b u sin ess . Because o f h ig h ly  
com petitive  co n d itio n s  In  many r e t a i l  b u s in esses , i t  i s  o f te n  argued th a t  
sm all r e t a i l  e s tab lish m en ts  a re  fo rced  to  absorb p a r t  o r a l l  o f th e  ta x . This 
I s  t ru e  in  communities Where th e re  a re  la rg e  departm ent s to re s  and chain  s to re s  
w ith  com petitive  p r ic e  p o l ic ie s .  They must a l l  c o l le c t  th e  ta x ,  but th e  
la r g e r  r e t a i l  u n i ts  may be a b le  to  charge lower p r ic e s .  This may c re a te  a 
sm a lle r  base upon which to  apply  th e  ta x . I t  i s  even more t ru e  in  communities
•V
n ear s ta t e  boundaries where th e  sm all business  may have to  compete w ith  those  
a c ro ss  th e  s ta te  l in e  no t a f fe c te d  by th e  ta x . The ab so rp tio n  of th e  ta x  
and th e  subsequent lo s s  o f  s a le s  a f f e c t  sm all o u t le ts  in  se v e ra l ways. F i r s t ,  
t h i s  co n d itio n  reduces t h e i r  p r o f i t s . Second, i t  reduces th e  purchasing
power o f th e  sm all business people and th e i r  fa m ilie s . And th i r d ,  i t  
e a ts  in to  t h e i r  c a p i ta l  fo r  expansion and Improvements.^9
B. Methods o f levy ing  consumption ta x e s . There a re  two b asic  approaches 
to  th e  lev y in g  of a  consumption ta x . One i s  th e  d i r e c t  approach through 
a  "spendings ta x " ; th e  o th e r i s  th e  in d ir e c t  approach though commodity 
ta x e s .
1 . The d i r e c t  method.
a . "Spendings ta x e s " .  The term  "spendings tax es"  was popu larized  
in  th e  U nited  S ta te s  in  a  p roposal by Congressman Ogden L. M ills  a f t e r  
World War I ,  to  s u b s t i tu te  a graduated  ta x  upon p erso n a l expend itu res fo r  
th e  s u r ta x . This would leave th e  normal ta x 'a s  th e  only in d iv id u a l Income 
t a x .  A graduated  spendings ta x  would be le v ie d  d i r e c t ly  upon consumers, in  
co n ju n c tio n  w ith  th e  n e t income ta x .  The b a s is  o f th e  ta x  would be th e  
ex p en d itu res  o f th e  consumers as defined  according  to  le g a l  requ irem ents and 
re p o rte d  to  th e  government. The ta x  would be c o lle c te d  through th e  use o f 
ta x  re tu rn s  f i l e d  by in d iv id u a ls , supplem entary to  or a p o r tio n  o f ,  th e  
re g u la r  Income ta x  r e tu rn s .  The taxpayer would determ ine h is  n e t sav ings 
du ring  th e  y e a r , th a t  i s ,  th e  n e t change in  h is  t o t a l  sav in g s , as In d ica ted  
by la rg e r  s e c u r i ty  or r e a l  p ro p erty  h o ld in g s , payments on l i f e  in su ran ce , 
re d u c tio n  in  d e b t, e tc .  He would th en  s u b tra c t  t h i s  f ig u re  o f sav ings from 
ta x a b le  income to  determ ine th e  amount o f expend itu res made during  th e  y ea r. 
E xpenditu res fo r  expansion o f a  business  owned by a person would be regarded  
as  a  form o f sav ings and thus would n o t be tax ed . Should th e  f ig u re  o f n e t  
sav ings be n e g a tiv e , th e  sum would be added to  income. Exemptions 
com parable to  th o se  o f th e  Income ta x  would be allow ed to  exclude minimum 
n ecessa ry  ex p en d itu res  from th e  ta x  and a d ju s t  th e  burden in  term s o f fam ily  
s iz e *  C erta in , o th e r  d ed u c tio n s, such as  expenses fo r  m edical care  and *
eddcat io n ,:o a u ld  be p e rm itted . The ta x  could be made p ro g re ss iv e , and 
very s te e p ly  a s ,  i f  th e  ta x  were in tended  p r im a rily  as an a n t i - in f la t io n a r y  
measure. The amounts due would be p a id  in  con junction  w ith  income tax es  
a t  th e  end o f  th e  year.
b . E va lua tion  o f th e  spendings ta x . In  g e n e ra l, th e  use of th e  
spendings ta x  would allow  th e  a tta in m en t of th e  goals o f th e  expenditu res 
b a s is  much more adequate ly  than  th e  commodity ta x e s . The d e s ire d  p a t te rn  
o f  burden d is t r ib u t io n  could be ob tained  in  much more p re c ise  fash io n  
th a n  by th e  use o f commodity ta x e s . The use o f th e  exemptions and 
p ro g re ss iv e  r a te s  would n o t only e lim in a te  re g re ss iv e n e ss  bu t a lso  allow  
th e  a tta in m en t o f d es ired  degrees o f p ro g ress io n . The r e l a t iv e  burden on 
various persons would conform much more c lo se ly  w ith  d e s ired  s tandards o f 
e q u ity  than  th a t  o f  s a le s  and exc ise  ta x e s . The spendings ta x  i s  lik ew ise  
much le s s  l ik e ly  to  g en era te  wage in c re a s e s .3®
(1 ) F a ilu re  to  reach  sav in g s . The o b jec tio n s  to  th e  spendings 
ta x  a re  tw o -fo ld . In  p a r t ,  they  include th e  b asic  o b jec tio n s  to  th e  
expend itu res  b a s is ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  ex c lu siv e  use o f i t —th e  f a i lu r e  to  reach  
on a  c u rre n t b a s is  th e  la rg e  accum ulations of w ealth  made by persons saving 
h ig h  p ercen tages Of t h e i r  incomes, le ssen ed  b u i l t - i n  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  and th e  
g re a te r  d e f la tio n a ry  e f f e c t ,  a d isadvantage in  n o n - in f la tio n a ry  p e r io d s .
(2 ) A d m in istra tiv e  problem s. The o th e r  b asic  o b je c tio n  i s  
t h a t  o f a d m in is tra tiv e  com plexity . S evera l problems must be solved:
o (a )  In  a d d itio n  to  th e  problems o f income ta x a t io n , one 
a d d it io n a l  s te p  i s  re q u ire d , namely, th e  c a lc u la t io n  o f n e t  savings during  
th e  p e r io d . This i s  n o t an in su p erab le  t a s k ,  but i s  an a d d it io n a l source 
p f  nu isan ce , e r r o r ,  and evasion .
(b ) S p ec ia l tre a tm e n t must be g iven  to  consumer durables* 
t,o avoid  th e  in e q u it ie s  consequent to  I r r e g u la r i ty  o f expend itu res  w ith
p ro g ress iv e  ta x  ra te s*
(c )  The d e lin e a tio n  o f consumption expend itu res from 
th o se  fo r  investm ent and fo r  business purposes would be troublesom e.
(d) The trea tm en t o f g i f t s  i s  troublesom e and could 
le a d  to  o u tr ig h t  ta x  evasion .
(e )  The a n tic ip a to ry  e f f e c t  o f  In tro d u c tio n  o f th e  ta x  and 
changes in  th e  r a te s  could be very  troublesom e to  th e  economy. Timing; o f
ex p en d itu res  i s  su b je c t to  p erso n a l d is c r e t io n .  31
C onclusion. I t  may be th a t  a spendings ta x  i f
inaugura ted  a t  th e  r ig h t  tim e, could  be a  u se fu l Instrum ent o f f i s c a l  p o lic y  
in  a  war emergency. I t  no doubt could be a  good revenue r a i s e r  and perhaps 
cou ld  serve  as a b u ffe r  a g a in s t in f l a t io n .  I t  would re ach  luxury  and 
conspicuous consumption. I t  could a lso  encourage sav ing  a t  a  tim e when 
a d d it io n a l  c a p i ta l  form ation  was n ecessary .
( 3) The spendings ta x  a t  w o rk --In d ia ’s Expenditure Tax.
A spendings ta x  has never been employed in  th e  U nited S ta te s ,  Canada, or 
W estern Europe; to  d a te , th e  only co u n tr ie s  to  use th e  ta x  have been In d ia  
and Ceylon.
A ta x  on p erso n a l expenditu res has been in  e f f e c t  in  In d ia  
s in c e  A p ril 1 , 1958. The enactment was a r e s u l t  o f a  study conducted a t  th e  
re q u e s t o f th e  In d ian  Government by N icholas Kalder o f Cambridge U n iv e rs ity . 
The ta x  i s  le v ie d  annually  on expend itu res in cu rred  by in d iv id u a ls  and 
H indu u n d iv id ed #fa m ilie s  during a base y ea r. I t  i s  based On world-wide 
e x p en d itu re s , expend itu res w ith in  In d ia , or expenditu res w ith in  In d ia  and 
* expenditures o u ts id e  In d ia  from In d ian  so u rces , according  to  th e  re sid en ce  
and c i t iz e n s h ip  s ta tu s  o f th e  taxpayer* Expenditures above a  s tan d ard  
allow ance, g e n e ra lly  $30,000 a re  taxed  a t  sh a rp ly  p ro g ress iv e  r a t e s .  The
b as ic  in te n t  of th e  Act i s  to  ta x  ex p en d itu res , exceeding th e  s tandard  
allow ance, which i s  in  th e  n a tu re  o f p erso n a l consumption. Expenditure 
fo r  expenses o f business  or employment, investm ents, c a p i ta l  o u tlay s  
fo r  p e rso n a l u se , and g i f t s  a re  th e re fo re  exempt. In  a d d it io n , c e r ta in  
expend itu res  which do re p re se n t p ersonal consumption a re  exempted as 
b a s ic  l iv in g  c o s ts .
(a )  H ig h lig h ts  o f I n d ia 's  Expenditures ta x .  Persons 
su b je c t to  th e  ta x :
( i )  c i t iz e n s  who a re  r e s id e n ts  a re  ta x a b le  on 
w orld-w ide expend itu res re g a rd le s s  of th e  source o f funds;
( i i )  c i t iz e n s  who a re  not re s id e n ts  and a l ie n s  
who a re  r e s id e n ts  a re  taxed  on expend itu res in  In d ia  and expend itu res 
w orld-w ide i f  made from funds derived  from Ind ian  sources;
( i l l )  a l ie n s  who a re  not re s id e n ts  a re  taxed  
on ly  on expend itu res  in  In d ia  bu t re g a rd le s s  of source o f fu nds.
(b ) C orporations a re  n o t su b je c t to  th e  expenditu re
tax*
(c )  Exempt tax p ay e rs . Any taxpayer whose income from 
a l l  sources does no t exceed Rs36,000 in  any base year i s  exempt fo r  t h a t  
y e a r . Former r u le r s  of Ind ian  S ta te s  a re  t r e a te d  s p e c ia l ly .  Expenditures 
o u t o f  t h e i r  p riv y  purses a re  exempt.
(d ) Expenditures in c u rred . In  e f f e c t  expend itu res a re
tax ed  when paid, or accrued , whichever occurs f i r s t .
(e )  A ttr ib u tio n  r u le s ,  ( i )  Expenditures made by o th e r
persons to  s a t i s f y  an o b lig a tio n  o f th e  taxpayer in  excess o f Rs^jOOO; and
( i i )  i f  th e  taxpayer i s  a  Hindu undivided fam ily , any expenditu re  in cu rred  
by a  dependent o f th e  fam ily  Out o f any income o r p ro p erty  t ra n s fe r re d
d i r e c t ly  o r in d i r e c t ly  to  th e  dependent by th e  taxpayer a re  t r e a te d  as
/
incurred by the taxpayer*
38.
( f )  C e rta in  durable goods. Expenditures "by way of c a p i ta l  
expenditu re" on th e  purchase o f b u ll io n , p recious s to n es , .jewelry, f u rn i tu re  
and o th e r household goods, autom obiles and o ther conveyances, or any o th er 
a r t i c l e s  " fo r  th e  personal use of th e  taxpayer or any of h is  dependents"
must be spread over a  f iv e -y e a r  period  fo r  purposes of ta x .  Twenty p ercen t 
o f th e  expend itu re  i s  included in  expend itu res fo r  th e  year in  which i t  i s  
in cu rred  and 20 p ercen t i s  added to  th e  expenditures fo r  each o f th e  four 
succeeding y e a rs .
(g) Exemptions. Any revenue o r c a p i ta l  expenditures 
in cu rred  by th e  taxpayer "wholly or ex c lu siv e ly "  fo r  th e  purpose of h is  
b u s in e ss , p ro fe ss io n , vocation , or occupation or fo r  th e  purpose of earn ing  
income from any o th er source i s  exempt from the  expenditu res ta x .  C a p ita l 
expenditu re  wholly and ex c lu s iv e ly  fo r  th e  purpose o f th e  tax p ay e r’s 
business i s  exempt from expenditures ta x .  C erta in  non-business expenditu res 
a re  a lso  exempt, such a s : investm ents, c o n tr ib u tio n s  to  c a p i ta l ,  repayment 
o f  lo a n s , i n t e r e s t  payments, a c q u is it io n  o f immovable p ro p erty , c o n tr ib u tio n  
to  a  p ro v id e n t, t h r i f t ,  or pension fund, and insurance premiums.
Purchase o f books, works o f a r t ,  or th e  purchase of 
l iv e s to c k  a re  exempt. Expenditures w ith in  In d ia  fo r  a pub lic  or r e l ig io u s  
purpose a re  exempt. G if ts ,  donations, and se ttlem en ts  a re  exempt. A ll 
ta x e s  except those  on movable a s s e ts ,  customs d u tie s ,  and lo c a l  p roperty  tax es  
a re  exempt. F in a l ly ,  c e r ta in  personal expend itu res a re  exempt; such as : 
th o se  of a  taxpayer whose t o t a l  income i s  le s s  than  Rs36, 000,  th o se  in cu rred  
in  a  c i v i l  o r c rim in a l p roceeding , m arriage ex pend itu res, th o se  in cu rred  fo r  
th e  maintenance of ta x p ay e r’s p a re n ts , medical expenses, and. those  fo r  
ed u ca tio n  o u ts id e  In d ia .
(h ) Y ie ld . The expenditu res ta x  was expected to  y ie ld  
10 m illio n  Rupees fo r  each of th e  f i s c a l  years 1958 to  1959• (A Rupee i s  
w orth  approxim ately 21 cen ts  in  U nited S ta te s  currency. ) ^ 2
2 . In d ire c t  or commodity ta x e s . Commodity tax es  may be c la s s i f ie d  
under th re e  headings—customes d u tie s ,  s p e c if ic  commodity ta x e s , and genera l 
s a le s  ta x e s . C losely  a l l i e d  in  economic c h a ra c te r  a re  le v ie s  on the  
payment fo r  c e r ta in  s e rv ic e s , such as amusement t i c k e t  ta x e s , tax es  on 
t ra n s p o r ta t io n ,  te lephone messages and te leg ram s, tax e s  on h o te l  rooms 
and club dues ta x e s , s to ck  Issue  and t r a n s f e r  ta x e s , back check ta x e s , 
mortgage reco rd ing  tax es  and o th e r le v ie s  on f in a n c ia l  t r a n s f e r s  may be 
conv ienen tly  l i s t e d  in  connection w ith  commodity and se rv ic e  ta x e s , s in ce  
such t r a n s f e r s  may be viewed as a form of s e rv ic e ,
a . Customs d u tie s .
( l )  The concept. T a r i f f  or custom d u tie s  a re  tax es  le v ie d  
upon goods c ro ss in g  n a tio n a l boundaries, and they  a re  g e n e ra lly  c o lle c te d  
from im porters seeking advantage in  th e  country  which le v ie s  such d u tie s . 
C onsequently, such d u tie s  can be considered  a  "premium" upon th e  economic 
advantage th e  producers o f one country  can ga in  by s e l l in g  th e i r  commodities 
in  fo re ig n  m arkets.
C la s s i f ic a t io n  o f t a r i f f  r a t e s .  T a r i f f  d u tie s  a re  le v ie d  in  
two b as ic  p a tte rn s :  ( l )  s p e c if ic  d u tie s ,  and (2) ad valorem d u tie s .
S p e c if ic  d u tie s  a re  le v ie d  as a  d e f in i te  sum of money upon the  given u n its  
o f  goods--such as 2 cen ts  per pound on sugar or $1 p er g a llo n  on Scotch 
whiskey. Ad valorem d u tie s  a re  le v ie d  according to  th e  value of th e  
im ported good—such as 25 p e rcen t on th e  value of diamonds or 10 percen t 
on th e  value o f.au tom ob iles. S p e c if ic  d u tie s  a re  more f le x ib le  and are  
in c lin e d  to  be re g re s s iv e  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  cheaper goods. They a re  cheaper 
to  ad m in iste r because th e re  i s  no process o f v a lu a tio n  involved . Ad valorem 
d u tie s  a re  more f le x ib le  and a re  n o t so re g re s s iv e  as ap p lied  to  cheaper goods. 
The l a t t e r  a re  more expensive and d i f f i c u l t  to  adm in iste r because o f th e  
v a lu a tio n  problem.
(2 ) O bjectives o f t a r i f f  r a t e s .  "Three o b je c tiv e s  can be 
fo llow ed . They a re : th e  f re e  l i s t ,  t a r i f f  fo r  revenues, and t a r i f f  fo r
]3 $ rtec tio n . Those commodities p laced  on th e  f re e  l i s t  may e n te r  w ithout 
any eustom duty payment. These goods a re  f re e  to  flow W ithout ta x  
h in d ran ces . A t a r i f f  fo r  revenue i s  one where th e  r a te s  a re  s e t  a t  a 
le v e l  th a t  w i l l  n o t d iscourage th e  goods from coming in  bu t a t  a le v e l  
th a t  w i l l  secure  th e  g r e a te s t  n e t revenue y&Lld. A t a r i f f  fo r  p ro te c tio n  
i s  one where th e  r a te s  a re  s e t  h igh  enough to  g ive domestic producers 
adequate p ro te c tio n . A t r u ly  p ro te c tiv e  t a r i f f  w i l l  y ie ld  l i t t l e  revenue 
because i t  w i l l  a c tu a l ly  keep th e  goods o u t . "33 Another ta x  levy  i s  th e  
compensatory t a r i f f ;  a customs duty imposed on th e  im p o rta tio n  o f a  
commodity produced and su b je c t to  ex c ise  ta x  in  th e  tax in g  co u n try , a t  
th e  same r a t e  as th e  e x c is e , to  eq u a lize  th e  ta x  burden on th e  domestic 
and fo re ig n  p ro d u c ts .
(3 ) F is c a l  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f customs d u t ie s .  Though our 
t a r i f f s  have been u su a lly  c a l le d  p ro te c t iv e ,  they  have r a is e d  s u b s ta n tia l  
revenues. From 1789 to  1862 customs d u tie s  u su a lly  amounted to  over
90 p e rcen t o f th e  t o t a l  f e d e ra l  revenues. From about 1868 to  1910 they  
c o n s ti tu te d  between to  p e rcen t o f n a tio n a l r e c e ip ts .  During th e  1920’s 
t a r i f f  revenues averaged w e ll over $500 m illio n  per year or about 12 p ercen t 
o f  t o t a l  revenue. They dropped o f f  to  about ko p ercen t in  th e  1930’s .  From 
World War I I  u n t i l  1950 customs d u tie s  averaged somewhat over $t00 m illio n  
p er y e a r . In  1-955 customs revenues s ta r te d  clim bing soon reach in g  $606 
m ill io n s ;  in  1959 th ey  were $9^8 m illio n s ; in  1962 $1,008  m illio n s ; in  
1963 th ey  were $ l , 2t l  m illio n s  or ju s t  about l . t  p e rcen t o f  th e  fe d e ra l  
governm ent’s income fo r  th a t  y e a r .3^
(h-) The economics o f t a r i f f s .
(a )  T a r i f f s  fo r  revenue. The b asic  o b je c tiv e  o f  many 
in d iv id u a l t a r i f f  r a te s  i s  to  r a i s e  revenue r a th e r  th an  p ro te c t  home
in d u s try . The p r in c ip le s  to  be considered  a re :
( i )  T a r if f s  should be le v ie d  upon those goods which 
cannot be produced w ith in  th e  country or th o se  which can be produced only  a t  
a  m a te r ia l d isadvantage.
( i i )  They should be le v ie d  upon a  sm all number o f 
s e le c te d  commodities fo r  which l^ r e  i s  a  wide and in e la s t ic  demand and upon 
lu x u r ie s .
( i i i )  G enerally , th ey  should not be le v ie d  upon th e  
b as ic  n e c e s s i t ie s  o f a  f a i r  s tandard  o f l iv in g .
( iv )  The r a te s  should be kept reasonable so as to  
minimize smuggling and evasion .
(b ) T a r i f f s  fo r  p ro te c tio n . A p ro te c tiv e  t a r i f f  p laces 
major emphasis upon t a r i f f  r a te s  h igh  enough to  ’’keep o u t” c e r ta in  goods so 
as  to  p ro te c t  domestic in d u s tr ie s  from fo re ig n  com petition . Many economic 
arguments have been advanced in  favor of such t a r i f f s :  ( l )  to  p ro te c t and
encourage ”in fa n t in d u s t r ie s ” u n t i l  they  can in c rease  th e i r  p ro d u c tiv ity  
and lower t h e i r  c o s ts  to  compete in  world m arkets: (2) to  conserve th e  
’’home m arket” fo r  domestic producers; ( 3 ) to  a id  in  b u ild in g  a d iv e r s if ie d  
economy; (^ )  to  in su re  economic s e lf - s u f f ic ie n c y  in  th e  event o f war;
( 5 ) to  m ain tain  th e  wage and standard  o f l iv in g  o f th e  domestic w orkers; 
and (6 ) to  p ro te c t  a g a in s t th e  "dumping” of cheap fo re ig n  goods upon th e  
dom estic m arket. The counter argument i s  th a t  fo r  a l l  t h i s  p ro te c tio n  th e  
consumer r e a l ly  .pays and o fte n  because th e  r i s e  in  p r ic e  i s  more than  th e  
t a r i f f  r a te s  he o f te n  pays a premimum to  th e  domestic producer, in  a d d itio n  
to  th e  amount of th e  t a r i f f .  The p ro te c tiv e  t a r i f f  has been c a lle d  th e  
"mother o f t r u s t s "  because i t  p laces  a  s tro n g e r g r ip  on th e  domestic economy 
and tends toward in te rn a l  monopoly,
b . E xcise ta x e s .
The second category  of in d i r e c t  consumption tax es  i s  th e  
s p e c if ic  commodity ta x  or ex c ise  ta x .  E xcise tax es  a re  le v ie d  upon 
goods and se rv ic e s  produced or so ld  w ith in  th e  boundaries o f th e  
g&vevtMRftXMB&i. viflit lev y in g  th e  ta x . G en era lly , th e  le g a l  impact of th e se  
ta x e s  i s  upon th e  producer o r d i s t r ib u to r ,  a lthough  th e  u ltim a te  incidence 
may be upon th e  consumer. U sually  " sp e c if ic  goods" a re  se le c te d  fo r  ex c ise  
ta x a t io n —th a t  i s ,  tax es  a re  le v ie d  a t  g iven r a te s  upon narrow c la s se s  o f  
goods, such as  beer and l iq u o rs ,  to b acco , le a th e r  goods, en te rta in m e n t, 
jew elry , and so f o r t h .3^
There a re  fo u r major bases upon which th e  ta x a t io n  of 
p a r t ic u la r  c la s se s  o f consumer expend itu res  may be j u s t i f i e d .  In  th e  
f i r s t  p la c e , th e  consumption expend itu res fo r  p a r t ic u la r  a r t i c l e s  may be 
reg ard ed  as a b e t te r  measure o f ta x  paying a b i l i t y  th an  t o t a l  consumption 
ex p en d itu res  as in  th e  spendings ta x . I f  spending c a p a c ity , r a th e r  than  
income, i s  th e  b e s t measure o f taxpaying  a b i l i t y  th en  ex c ises  may be 
regarded  as  p re fe ra b le  in  term s o f e q u ity , to  th e  g en era l s a le s  ta x .
E xcises designed to  d i s t r ib u te  th e  burden o f ta x a tio n  in  p ro p o rtio n  to  
consumption expend itu res  which a re  considered  to  c o n s t i tu te  s u ita b le  
measures o f taxpaying  a b i l i t y  a re  known as luxury  ta x e s .
Secondly, ex c ise  ta x a t io n  may be based upon th e  d e l ib e ra te  
d e s ire  to  c u r t a i l  th e  consumption o f commodities whose use r e s u l t s  in  c o s ts  
to  s o c ie ty  over and above th o se  in cu rred  in  t h e i r  p roduction  and /o r to  
p e n a liz e  th o se  persons who continue to  use th e  commodities d e sp ite  th e  
t a x .  Such ex c ises  a re  known as "sin "  or sumptuary ta x e s .  The liq u o r  and 
tobacco  tax e s  a re  th e  most im portan t example.
< u  The Sumptuary E x c ises .
(a )  The argument fo r  th e  l iq u o r ,  tobacco , and o th e r 
sum ptuary ex c ise s  r e s t s  p r im a rily  upon th e  co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  ou tpu t and 
u se  o f th e  commodities involved would reach  le v e ls  beyond th o se  regarded
as optimum were i t  no t fo r  th e  tax es  imposed on them. The use of th e  
commodities g ives r i s e  to  c e r ta in  r e a l  c o s ts  to  s o c ie ty  which do no t 
appear as  c o s ts  to  th e  p roducers, and th e re fo re  a re  no t r e f le c te d  in  the  
p r ic e s  f o r  which th e  a r t i c l e s  a re  sold# E valua tion  a f  th e  ahtt&twary ta^ es  
a c tu a l ly  used re q u ire s  an es tim ate  of th e se  in d ire c t  s o c ia l  c o s ts .  For 
l iq u o r ,  e s p e c ia lly  th a t  o f h igher a lco h o lic  c o n te n t, th e re  i s  s u b s ta n t ia l  
ev idence. The e f fe c ts  o f  excessive  use of liq u o r  upon th e  p e rso n fs 
fam ily , h is  work, and p o ss ib le  crime and autom obile acc id en ts  a re  w ell 
known. With beer and wine th e  argument i s  much le s s  s tro n g ; fo r  tobacco , 
i t  i s  even more d o u b tfu l. While some d i s u t i l i t y  may be c re a te d  fo r  non- 
smokers by tobacco smoke, f i r e  damage may be in c reased , and some p o ss ib le  
adverse h e a lth  e f f e c t  produced, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  argue th a t  th e re  a re  very 
s u b s ta n t ia l  r e a l  c o s ts  to  so c ie ty  a r is in g  from th e  u s e ,o f  th e  p ro d u c t, no t 
w ith stan d in g  th e  Surgeon G eneralfs re p o r ts  to  th e  c o n tra ry .
While th e  ta x e s  have m erit in  checking excessive  use and 
th u s  p roduction  o f th e  a r t i c l e s ,  a t  th e  same tim e th ey  p lace  a very heavy 
burden on th e  g re a t  m ajo rity  o f persons who use th e  commodities only 
m oderately . This p a t te rn  o f d is t r ib u t io n  cannot be j u s t i f i e d  on th e  
b a s is  of economic e f f e c t  but must be eva lua ted  in  term s of eq u ity  c o n s id e ra tio n s . 
On th e  one hand, i t  may be argued th a t  consensus o f op in ion  in  so c ie ty  
accep ts  th e  p r in c ip le  th a t  persons should be p enalized  taxw ise fo r  using  th e  
a r t i c l e ,  even in  m oderation. A ccordingly, th e  heavy burden which r e s t s  on 
th e  moderate u se rs  i s  in  conform ity w ith  th e  s tandards of eq u ity  in  d is t r ib u t io n  
l a i d  down by s o c ie ty , even though i t  i s  no t c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  p r in c ip le s  
which a re  g e n e ra lly  accepted as th e  prim ary b a s is  fo r  d is t r ib u t io n  o f ta x  
b u rd en s.37 -
(b ) On th e  o th e r hand, th e  sumptuary ex c ises  have been 
su b je c te d  to  s u b s ta n tia l  c r i t ic i s m  on e q u ity  grounds. I t  i s  argued th a t  th e
b a s is  o f th e  tax es  1b th e  moral judgment of persons re sp o n s ib le  fo r  
ta x  le g i s la t io n  th a t  th e  u se rs  ’’don’t  r e a l ly  need” th e  commodities and 
could  ju s t  a s  w ell g e t along w ithout them, or th a t  the  use o f th e
in  nasui wn&ae " a ia r u i" . The use a£ a m ora lity  b a s is  fo r  
ta x a t io n  i s  o f te n  regarded as somewhat flim sy  a t  b e s t.
The tax es  on c ig a r e t te s  and beer a re  c r i t i z e d  fo r  th e  
re g re s s iv e  d is t r ib u t io n  of burden which r e s u l t s .  The amount which a 
person spends on c ig a re t te s  i s  no t dependent upon h is  income i f  he 
smokes r e g u la r ly .  With th e  p re se n t ta x  r a t e s ,  th e  ab so lu te  burden upon th e  
low est income groups from th e  ta x  i s  very s u b s ta n t ia l .  The tax e s  upon 
l iq u o r  appear to  be p ro g re ss iv e . A f in a l  argument a g a in s t th e  ta x e s  i s  
th a t  o f evasion; p resen t tax es  a re  so high th a t  s tro n g  in c en tiv e  i s  
prov ided  fo r  i l l i c i t  p roduction  of l iq u o r  and smuggling of c ig a r e t te s .  
B ootlegging has many u n d es irab le  s o c ia l  e f f e c ts  and reduces ta x  revenue. 
In c re a se s  in  Canadian c ig a r e t te  tax es  in  1951 led  to  w holesale smuggling 
from th e  U nited S ta te s ,  which was d i f f i c u l t  to  check add became so s e r io u s  
t h a t  ev en tu a lly  th e  r a te  was reduced.
(c )  Y ie ld .
( i )  ( l )  F ed era l tobacco revenues. The 
fe d e ra l  ta x  r a t e  on c ig a r e t te s  i s  $8.^0  p er thousand fo r  those  weighing more 
th a n  3 pounds per thousand and $*+ per thousand fo r  th o se  weighing le s s  than  
3 pounds per th o u san d .39 Revenue to ta le d  more than  $2 b i l l io n  in  19^3 
Compared to  more th an  $1 .9  b i l l io n  in  1962. (See Table number i+.)
( i )  ( 2 ) S ta te  tobacco revenues. S ta te  
c i g a r e t t e  ta x  r a te s  range from 2 cen ts  to  8 cen ts  per package o f 20.^0 
S t ,a te  C ig a re tte  ta x e s , th e  f i r s t  o f which was imposed in  1921, have moved t  
fro m  an o r ig in a l  t o t a l  annual levy  of $350,000 to  $1.12  b i l l i o n  in  19^3 *
k5.
F o rty -e ig h t s ta te s  now impose a  c ig a re t te  ta x .  (See Table number j i .)  
V irg in ia ’s c ig a r e t te  ta x  r a te  i s  3 cen ts  per package o f 20. I t s  n e t 
c o l le c t io n  fo r  1963 was $ll*.6 m illio n  as compared to  $13.6  m illio n  in  
1961. V irg in ia  had no c ig a r e t te  ta x  before
( i )  (3) Local tobacco ta x e s . Local tobacco 
tax e s  were f i r s t  adopted in  th e  l a t e  1 9 2 0 's . These tax es  a re  confined to  
10 s ta t e s .  C u rren tly  225 c i t i e s ,  towns, and co u n ties  impose c ig a r e t te  
tax es  whose t o t a l  annual aggregate levy  i s  in  excess o f $1*0 .3  m illio n . 
Local tax es  on tobacco products o th e r th an  c ig a r e t te s  a re  imposed in  21 
co u n tie s  and c i t i e s  and amount to  somewhat more th an  $600,000 an n u ally . 
S ix  c i t i e s  in  V irg in ia  ta x  c ig a re t te s  but no t o th e r tobacco p ro d u cts. 
T o ta l r e c e ip ts  were $1,167,000 in  1963. The c i ty  o f Norfolk rece ived  
$570,000 in  1963 from th i s  s o u r c e .^
( i l )  ( l )  F edera l a lco h o l ta x  revenues. The 
f e d e ra l  ta x  r a t e  on d i s t i l l e d  s p i r i t s  of more th an  2b p ercen t i s  $10.50  
per, g a llo n , beer $9 per b a r re l ;  wines a re  taxed  from 17 cen ts  to  $3 A o 
p er g a l l o n . Revenue to ta le d  $3 .^  b i l l io n  in  1963 from a l l  a lcoho l 
ex c ise  tax es  compared to  $3.2 b i l l i o n  in  1961. (See Table number 6 . )
( i i )  ( 2 ) S ta te  a lcoho l ta x  revenues.
Although th e  s ta te s  obtained  some revenue from a lc o h o lic  beverage ex cises  
and l ic e n s e s  p r io r  to  th e  p ro h ib it io n  e r a , .t h i s  source d id  not become
an im portant revenue producer u n t i l  th e  re p e a l o f th e  l 8th  Amendment. 
Imm ediately fo llow ing  re p e a l ,  th e  s ta te s  imposed exc ises  on d i s t i l l e d  
s p i r i t s ,  w ine, b ee r, and o th e r beverages. T hirty -tw o s ta te s  c u r re n tly  
impose tax e s  on a lc o h o l. In  a d d itio n , th e  s ta te s  re q u ire  lic e n se  fee s  
o f d i s t i l l e r s ,  brew ers, w h o lesa le rs , r e t a i l e r s ,  and o th er businesses and 
occupations engaged in  th e  p roduction  and d is t r ib u t io n  o f a lco h o lic  
beverages. The monopoly system o p era tes  i n  16 s ta te s  where a l l  s a le s
TABLE HUMBER if.
F ed era l Tobacco Revenue 
(M illio n s  of D o lla rs)
SUBJECT OF FISCAL YEAR
THE TAX 1961 1962 1963
C igars if9.061f if 9.726 50.232
C ig a re tte s 1 ,923 .5 1,956.5 2 ,010.5
Other IT*97^ 19 .^83 l 8 .if8^
TOTAL 1,991 .1 2 ,025 .7 2 , 079.2
Source: Treasury Bulletin, U.S. Treasury Department, September 1963,
TABLE HUMBER 5-
Het S ta te  Tobacco Tax C o lle c tio n s ; S e lec ted  y e a rs .
( thousands o f d o lla rs )
YEAR TOTAL TOBACCO 
TAX
CIGARETTES OTHER
TOBACCO
PERCEHTAGE
FOR
CIGARETTES
1921 32if 32if 100.0
1931 15,9^7 l^ > 5 7 l,lf90 90.7
19^1 106, 29if 103,205 3,089 97.1
1951 ^51,989 ififif,if09 7,580 98.3
1961 1,027,536 9 ^ 5 ,1 ^ 32,392 96.8
1963 1,153,290 1 , 132, 8oif 20 , if 86 98.2
s in ce
1921 11,839,335 l l , 586, 00if 253,331 97.9
Source: Cigaret Taxes in the U.S., Volume XII, 1963.
vr.
h u h JB d T  QW 
THE TAX
D is t i l l e d  s p i r i t s
Wines
Beer
TOTAL:
TABLE NUMBER 6.
F edera l A lcohol Tax Revenue 
(thousands o f d o lla rs )
FISCAL YEAR
I96L
2, 311*,71*6 
97,803 
800,252 
3,212,801
2,1*23,330
99,922
818,230
3,341,282
T 963
2 , 507,068
103,733
830,855
3,441,656
Source: T reasury  B u lle t in ,  U.S. T reasury  Department, September, 1963-
TABLE NUMBER 7 .
S ta te  Tax C o lle c tio n s ; A lcoholic Beverages:
S e lec ted  Y ears, 1934-1982 
(M illio n s  o f  D o lla rs)
YEAR REVENUE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
RECEIPTS
1934 62 3 .1
1944 267 6 .6
1954 463 4 .2
1962 741 3 .6
«
Source: Tax O verlapping in  th e  U.S. f p. 13
48.
are made in State owned and operated liquor stores. State revenues from, 
alcoholic beverage excises and licenses rose from $8l million in 1934 to 
$774 million in 1961. Excises account for more than 75 percent of the 
total. In the fiscal year 1961 > the net eontrifewtieh tes the ruaaa
of the 16 monopoly states was $237 million.^ (See Table number 7.)
(ii) (3) Local alcohol beverages. Many cities 
operate their own liquor stores in Minnesota, South Dakota, North Dakota, 
and Wisconsin. The total amount of revenue collected at the local level 
in 1957 vas $21 million which was only one-tenth of the total local 
government revenue collected. Local governments also collected $47 million 
from the sale of alcoholic beverage licenses. 5^
(2) The luxury excise.
(a) Arguments for the tax. The basic justification for 
luxury excises is the argument that these taxes allow the attainment of 
the general advantages of expenditures based taxes with a more acceptable 
distribution of burden than that which results from a general sales tax*
The case for luxury excises is also based in part upon the philosophy that 
some goods are more necessary for a reasonable living standard than others; 
thus, expenditures on the less necessary ones are more suitable bases for 
taxation than local expenditures. "The luxury tax idea is appealing because 
it seems to indicate that the very wealthy will be taxed upon superfluous 
extravagances, such as yachts, diamond bracelets, and orchids, and that the 
hard working lower and middle classes will be correspondingly relieved.
Such a picture is entirely erroneous. As in so many tax instances the name 
is not what it seems. The only luxury taxes that justify the cost of 
administration are those that burden the poor and leave the wealthy practically 
unscathed.”^  The height of absurdity is reached in the'following quotation: 
"Every time that a man embraced his wife he would report the fact and have to
^9.
pay a luxury  ta x  and th e re  would be sp ie s  and agen ts to  see th a t  th e  law i s  
en fo rc ed .” (Law o f th e  Province o f New Mexico, Harvey Fergunsen, Rio Grande, 
P . 191.)
(b) Arguments a g a in s t th e  ttuc* Bar a  hrnner a#
commodities fo r  ta x a t io n , i t  Bhould be p o ss ib le  to  avoid th e  heavy burden 
on th e  poor and th e  reg re ss iv en ess  of th e  u sual s a le s  ta x ,  although in  
p ra c t ic e  th i s  r e s u l t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  accom plish. On th e  o th e r hand, th e  
p r in c ip le  o f luxury  ex c ise  ta x a tio n  i s  su b jec t to  very severe l im i ta t io n s .
( i )  D iscrim in atio n  according to  p re fe ren ce . A 
fundam ental argument a g a in s t any form of s e le c t iv e  expenditu re  ta x a tio n  i s  
based on th e  wide v a r ia t io n  in  p re fe ren ce  among persons fo r  d i f f e r e n t  
commodities. Thus, no m atter how c a re fu l ly  a l i s t  o f commodities fo r  
a p p lic a tio n  of ex c ise  tax es  i s  chosen, those  persons who happen to  have a 
r e l a t iv e ly  h igh  p re fe ren ce  fo r  the  commodities which a re  taxed  a re  p en a lized . 
Persons who a re  in  e s s e n t ia l ly  th e  same economic circum stances, except fo r  
th e  f a c t  th a t  they  have p re fe ren ces  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  goods, a re  not taxed  
eq u a lly , and th e  r e l a t iv e  burden on persons in  d i f f e r e n t  circum stances i s  
no t in  p ro p o rtio n  to  t h e i r  economic w e ll-b e in g . The luxury  tax es  a re  not 
d e l ib e r a te ly  designed to  p en a lize  persons who purchase tihe commodities but 
merely to  d is t r ib u te  th e  r e la t iv e  ta x  burden in  p ro p o rtio n  to  c e r ta in  
c r i t e r i a  of taxpaying  a b i l i t y .
( i i )  F inding s u ita b le  measures of a b i l i t y .  A second 
and r e la te d  l im i ta t io n  i s  th e  d i f f i c u l ty  in  s e le c tin g  c a te g o rie s  of 
commodities which a re  s u ita b le  measures o f taxpaying a b il i ty *  There a re  
r e l a t iv e ly  few commodities on which expenditu res a re  p ro g ressiv e  r e la t iv e
to  income, w ith  r e l a t iv e ly  sm all amounts purchased by th e  lower income groups. 
The g oal of a lux u ry  ex c ise  ta x  s tru c tu re —of tax in g  those, s p e c if ic
consumption expenditu res which a re  b e t te r  measures o f taxpaying a b i l i t y  th an  
t o t a l  consumption ex p en d itu res—is  no t p o ss ib le  of a tta in m en t, i f  any 
s ig n if ic a n t  amount of revenue i s  to  be ob ta ined . A study by Musgrove 
i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  reg re se iv eaesa  e f  tn© d is t r ib u t io n  o f th e  U nited S ta te s  
f e d e ra l  ex c ise  s tru c tu re  as a whole in c lu d in g  sumptuary as w e ll as luxury  and 
o th e r e x c is e s . (See F igure number I . )
( i i i )  R e a llo ca tio n  o f re so u rc e s . The c h ie f  argument 
advanced a g a in s t th e  ex c ises  on th e  b a s is  o f economic e f f e c ts  i s  th e  tendency 
o f th e  tax es  to  b ring  about a r e a l lo c a t io n  of resou rces away from th e  
optimum. The sumptuary ex c ises  a re  d e l ib e ra te ly  designed to  check p roduction  
o f goods th e  output o f which i s  excessive in  terms of economic w e lfa re , and 
a re  th u s  j u s t i f i e d  on th a t  b a s is .  However, th e  luxury  ex c ises  a re  no t 
in tended  to  b rin g  about t h i s  r e s u l t ,  except when used as wartime measures to  
r a t io n  "scarce  goods” , bu t they  alm ost in e v ita b ly  do so . When a ta x  i s  
imposed on th e  s a le  of a p a r t ic u la r  good, some persons w i l l  cease to  buy th e  
commodity or w i l l  buy le s s  of i t  and buy o th e r th in g s  in s te a d . They have 
f a i le d  to  o b ta in  optimum s a t i s f a c t io n  from th e i r  incomes, y e t th e  government 
has gained no ta x  revenue. P roduction  of o th er goods w i l l  in c re a se , and th a t  
o f  taxed  goods w i l l  decrease ; i f  optimum a llo c a t io n  of re so u rces  was 
p rev io u s ly  a t ta in e d ,  a poorer a l lo c a t io n  w i l l  result.**?
( iv )  E ffe c t on business owners and o th e r fa c to r  owners. 
B usiness firm s may f in d  s h if t in g  d i f f i c u l t ,  e s p e c ia lly  when s u b s t i tu te  
p roducts  a re  no t tax ed , and a  p o r tio n  of the  burden may rem ain upon th e  owners 
o f  th e  firm s fo r  s u b s ta n tia l  p e rio d s . M arginal firm s may be fo rced  out of 
b u sin ess  and experience a lo s s  o f c a p i ta l  in  th e  p ro cess . The d ec lin e  in  th e  
ou tpu t o f taxed  goods w i l l  reduce p r ic e s  of s p e c ia liz e d  f a c to rs  used in  t h e i r  
p ro d u c tio n , and th u s  lower th e  incomes of th ese  fa c to r  owners, a  p o r tio n  o f th e
burden thus being removed from th e  consumers of th e  p roduct. A part from the  
problems of s h if t in g ,  compliance w ith  th e  ta x  laws may involve considerab le  
nuisance and c o s t ,  th e  burden o f which may r e s t  fo r  a time on th e  owners, and 
th e  ta x  may c re a te  com petitive d istu rb an ces  and a l t e r  methods of p roduction . 
F in a l ly ,  th e  basic  economic o b jec tio n  to  a l l  expenditure based tax es  i s  non- 
in f la t io n a ry  p eriods a p p lie s  to  excise  as w ell as to  o ther tax es  in  th e  group.
(c )  D efects in  th e  a c tu a l  ex c ise  tax  s tru c tu r e .  The 
o b jec tio n ab le  fe a tu re s  of ex c ise  ta x a tio n  a re  agravated in  p ra c tic e  by th e  
f a i lu r e  to  adhere c a re fu lly  to  accepted  standards in  th e  estab lishm en t o f th e  
ex c ise  ta x  system. Often such tax es  a re  imposed p rim arily  fo r  th e  purpose of 
r a is in g  more revenue w ith  l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  to  th e  economic e f f e c ts  and 
in e q u i t ie s .
( i )  T axation  o f goods and se rv ices  used in  p roduction . 
The p re se n t U nited S ta te s  ta x  s tru c tu re  includes sev e ra l ex c ises  which apply 
p r im a rily  to  expenditures by business firm s r a th e r  than  to  consumption 
ex p en d itu res. Taxes on telephone s e rv ic e , business machines, e t c . ,  become 
business expenses and a re  l ik e ly  to  be s h if te d  to  th e  custom ers o f th e  firm . 
The u ltim a te  burden i s  d is t r ib u te d  haphazardly w ith  no r e la t io n  to  a b i l i t y  to  
pay in  any sense .
( i i )  Use of s p e c if ic  r a te s .  Use of s p e c if ic  ta x  
r a t e s  th a t  do no t vary w ith  th e  value of th e  product p lace  a  d isp ro p o rtio n a te
burden on th e  u se rs  of th e  cheaper ty p e s , in c reases  th e  reg re ss iv en ess  o f th e
ta x e s ,  and tends to  d riv e  th e  cheaper brands o ff  th e  m arket.
( i i i )  Pyramiding. Since th e  excise  tax es  a re  fo r  th e
most p a r t  le v ie d  a t  th e  m anufacturing le v e l ,  considerab le  d i r e c t  pyramiding 
probably  occurs.
( iv )  T echnical problem s. Many of th e  ex c ise  tax es  were 
enacted  h a s t i ly ,  w ith  l i t t l e  c a re fu l  wording of th e  l e g is la t io n ;  th e  tendency
TABLE NUMBER 8.
S ta te  Luxury Tax, Selected Years, 
(Millions of dollars)
1922 - 1961
YEAR
MOTOR
FUEL
TAX
PERCENT 
OF TOTAL 
COLLECTION
AMUSEMENT
TAX
PERCENT 
OF TOTAL 
COLLECTION
PUBLIC
UTILITY
TAXES
PERCENT OF 
TOTAL 
COLLECTION
1922 * 13
19^2 c 9^0 2^.1$ 33 .8$ $100 2.6$
1952 1,870 19.0* 157 1.6$ 228 2.3$
1956 2,687 20.1$ 223 1.7$ 300 2.2$
1961 3> 3l 18.1$ 301 1.6$ 375 2.0$
Source: Tax Overlapping In the United States, p .27
to  reg ard  them as temporary lessened  th e  I n te r e s t  in  re v is in g  th e  le g is la t io n  
or in  developing ex tensive  re g u la tio n s . "Major problems a re :
1 ) . A s a t is f a c to ry  le g a l  b as is  vas lack in g  fo r  
determ ina tion  o f tax ab le  j?riee on d i r e c t  enxee by m aaufaeturers to  r e t a i l e r s .
2 ) .  Some of th e  c la s se s  o f tax ab le  goods, e sp e c ia lly  
th o se  su b je c t to  th e  r e t a i l  ex c ise , have not been c le a r ly  defined .
3 ) . The term  m anufacturing has not been c le a r ly  
d efin ed , p a r t ic u la r ly  w ith  regard  to  such a c t i v i t i e s  as re b u ild in g , and th e  
tre a tm e n t o f p r iv a te  brand m erchandise.
4 ) .  R egulations have been inadequate and ex c ise  
ta x  ru lin g s  have f re q u e n tly  no t been pub lished . Appeal procedures a re  
u n s a tis fa c to ry , and a u d itin g  of taxpayers has been inadequate.
(d ) S ta te  luxury ta x  system s. The s ta te s  have no t developed 
ex ten siv e  excise  ta x  systems but c o l le c t  s u b s ta n tia l  revenues from a r e la t iv e ly
few item s. The most im portant i s  th e  b en e fit-b ased  gaso lin e  ta x , le v ie d  in
a l l  s t a t e s .  Most s ta t e  ta x  le v ie s  a re  l im ite d  to  amusement ta x e s , u t i l i t y  ta x e s ,
and g aso lin e  ta x e s . (See Table number 8 .)
(e )  Local luxury ta x e s . Local s a le s  taxes a re  u su a lly  
lim ite d  to  m u n ic ip a lit ie s . They may apply to  s o f t  d r in k s , pub lic  u t i l i t y  
s e rv ic e s ,  adm issions, meals in  r e s ta u ra n ts ,  or o th er sp e c ia l commodities. Local 
government r e c e ip ts  and percentages of t o t a l  lo c a l  government revenues from 
luxury  ex c ise s  items fo r  1957 were:
Motor fu e ls  26 m illio n  0.2$
• Public u t i l i t i e s  225 m illio n  1.6$
Amusements 26 m illio n  0.2$
Other and u n a llo cab le  21 m illio n  0.1$
C. G eneral Sales Taxes. The most im portant type o f consumption-based ta x  
in  p resen t-d ay  ta x  s tru c tu re s  i s  th e  g en era l s a le s  ta x ,  a ta x  ap p lied  to  th e  
s a le  o f a  wide range* o f goods and s e rv ic e s . A u n iv e rsa l s a le s  ta x  would reach
a l l  consumption expend itu res; th o se  a c tu a l ly  in  use apply  to  a co n sid e rab le  
narrow er range, because major item s o f ex p en d itu res , p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  housing 
and various personal, s e rv ic e s , a re  alm ost never included w ith in  th e  scope o f 
th e  ta x . The s a le s  ta x  I s  th e  major souree o f s ta te  revenue, ana la  th e  
most im portant elem ent in  th e  ta x  s tru c tu re s  o f many c o u n tr ie s  in  Europe, 
South America, and elsew here. The g en era l s a le s  ta x  i s  th e  su b je c t of 
P a r t  IV.
PART IV. GENERAL SALES TAXES.
A. In tro d u c tio n . The th i r d  category  under th e  c l a s s i f ic a t io n  o f consumption 
b a s is  i s  th a t  o f th e  genera l s a le s  ta x e s . "Perhaps no more numerous or le s s  
w e ll-d e fin ed  a group of tax es  i s  p laced  w ith in  one c la s s  than  i s  g en e ra lly  
included  in  th e  expression ' " sa le s  ta x " .  "Sales tax? appears to  denote a  ta x  
th e  l i a b i l i t y  fo r  which a r is e s  upon th e  s a le  of p ro p erty . Yet tax es  based 
upon th e  fu rn ish in g  o f w ate r, g as , e l e c t r i c i t y ,  communications and o th er p u b lic  
u t i l i t y  s e rv ic e s , o f te n  no t " s a le s " in  le g a l  contem plation , a re  commonly under­
sto o d  to  be s a le s  ta x e s . By common usage th e  expression  a lso  o f te n  includes 
tax e s  le v ie d  on th e  p roduction  o f c o a l, o re , tim ber, and o th e r n a tu ra l  resource; 
p ro d u c ts , p r io r  to  s a le  and indeed ir r e s p e c t iv e  o f whether such p ro p erty  i s  ever 
s o ld .
The modern genera l s a le s  ta x  i s  th e  outgrowth o f e a r l i e r  ex c ises  or stamp 
ta x e s .  I t  u su a lly  appeared f i r s t  in  Europe, as an emergency ta x  supplementing 
e x is t in g  exc ise  d u tie s .  From Europe the  genera l s a le s  ta x  has spread  ra p id ly  
to  many p a r ts  o f th e  w orld, lo s in g , in  p a r t  i t s  ch a ra c te r  as an emergency ta x , 
and assuming a re g u la r  p lace  in  ta x  system s. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say ju s t  when 
an  ex c ise  or stamp ta x  becomes a  g en era l s a le s  ta x . There a re  as many v a r ie t ie s  
o f th e  g en era l s a le s  ta x  as th e re  a re  n a tio n s  c o lle c t in g  th e  ta x ,  fo r  th e  
c h a r a c te r is t ic s  of th e  ta x  depend upon r e la t iv e  co n d itio n s .
The g en era l s a le s  ta x  i s  fre q u e n tly  c a lle d  a tu rnover ta x ,  a t r a n s f e r  ta x ,  
a g ross r e c e ip ts  ta x ,  a m anufacturers and m erchant’s ta x ,  a  m erchant’s ta x ,  a 
p ro d u c e rs ’ t a x , . a  g en era l stamp ta x ,  and o th er names. But whatever be th e  name o f 
th e  ta x ,  i t  i s  la id  upon th e  s a le  by tax ab le  persons as a more o r le s s  g en era l 
ta x  a t  uniform  r a t e s . "^9
B. H is to ry  o f th e  g en era l s a le s  ta x .  In v e s tig a tio n  has rev ea led  th a t  th e  
g en e ra l s a le s  ta x  l ik e  o th e r  modern tax es  i s  o f  very an c ien t o r ig in .  "Ancient
56.
Athens l a id  various tax es  on th e  s a le s  of commodities in  th e  m arkets, and on 
s a le s  o f landed p ro p e rty . The ta x a tio n  of sa le s  of s p e c if ic  commodities, l ik e  
s a l t ,  was common in  Egypt, China, In d ia  and o ther an c ien t s t a t e s .  In  Homan 
tim es, th e  genera l s a le s  ta x  was in troduced  by Augustus. He la id  a  ta x  of 
one p e rcen t upon a l l  a r t i c l e s ,  movable goods, or f ix tu r e s ,  so ld  in  m arkets, o r 1 
by a u c tio n , even a t  Home and in  th e  I t a l i a n  p en in su la . On slav es  th e  duty 
was 2 p e rc en t. I t  le d  to  such re s is te n c e  th a t  Augustus was ab le  to  m aintain  
i t  only on th e  p lea  th a t  i t  was necessary  fo r  th e  maintenance of th e  army. 
C a lig u la  abo lished  i t .  In  th e  Middle Ages, when Europe was s p l i t  up in to  a 
number o f p r in c ip a l i t i e s ,  th e  Feudal Lords o fte n  t r i e d  th ese  g en era l s a le s  
ta x e s , which always met w ith  g re a t r e s is ta n c e .  A ll through th e  Middle Ages 
ta x e s  on th e  s a le  o f p a r t ic u la r  commodities and e s p e c ia lly  upon th e  n e c e s s i t ie s  
o f l i f e  were common. France ventured  in to  th e  s a le s  ta x  f i e ld  se v e ra l tim es 
but each tim e they  were abo lished  because of in tim id a tio n  by th e  tax ed . The; 
only country  where i t  was perm anently le v ie d  was Spain. I t  was in troduced  as a  
n a tio n a l ta x  in  13^2. The a lc a v a la  as i t  was c a lle d  le d  to  much d i f f i c u l ty  
bu t i t  was con tinued  by Spanish a u th o r i t ie s .  The consequences o f th e  a lc a v a la  
a re  explored very f u l ly  by Spanish w r i te r s .  In  those  days th e  la rg e  e s ta te s  
were g e n e ra lly  e n ta ile d  and consequently  no t su b je c t to  s a le  as were sm aller 
p ro p e r t ie s .  The ta x  th e re fo re  f e l l  w ith  crushing  s e v e r ity  upon th e  poor every 
tim e th e i r  lands changed hands. Some w r i te rs  have sa id  th a t  th e  ta x  was th e  
c h ie f  cause o f S p a in 's  economic dow nfall in  th e  l a t e r  middle a g e s . "5^ R e lie f  
from th e  a lc a v a la  was one o f th e  enticem ents o ffe red  to  Spanish adven tu rers  
to  th e  New World. ( P r e s c o t t 's  Conquest of Peru , Page 885 .)
C. The general sales tax in the United States.
1 . Federal. The first movement for a general sales tax in the United States 
occurred during the Civil War. The national income tax was adopted and a heavy
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FIGURE NUMBER 1
Federal E xcise  Tex Payments as P ercen tages e f  Inceme, 
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and comprehensive system of ex c ise  tax es  was in troduced . The excise  d u tie s  
and th e  income ta x  supp lied  over h a lf  of th e  C iv il  War ta x  R ece ip ts . D espite  
th e  support fo r  th e  ta x  o f th e  New York Chamber o f Commerce, th e  Boston Board 
of T rade, and s im ila r  o rg a n iz a tio n s , Congress r e je c te d  a l l  p roposals  fo r  a 
g en era l s a le s  ta x .  Even a f t e r  th e  War when th e  ta x  system was undergoing 
d ra s t ic  re v is io n s ;  such as abolishm ent o f th e  income ta x  in  1872 and reform ­
a tio n  o f th e  exc ises  and customs d u tie s ,  Congress f a i le d  to  adopt th e  ta x .
The post-W orld War I  movement fo r  a genera l s a le s  ta x  o r ig in a te d  in  
o p p o sitio n  to  tax es  lay in g  heavy claim s upon business p r o f i t s  and personal 
income. Senator Borah in troduced  a  gross s a le s  tra n sa c tio n s  ta x  b i l l  in  1910 
but i t  f a i le d  of adop tion . Other subsequent b i l l s  were in troduced  in  1920,
1921, and l a t e r ,  a l l  f a i le d  of passage. S everal groups advocated passage of 
th e  b i l l s  each w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  o b je c tiv e . One group demanded a  g en era l s a le s  
ta x  as a s u b s t i tu te  fo r  a l l  e x is t in g  fe d e ra l  ta x e s . The la r g e s t  group of 
advocates merely wanted th e  e x is t in g  fe d e ra l  ta x  system revamped w ith  removal 
o f the: le s s  d e s ira b le  tax es  such a s ; excess p r o f i t s  ta x e s , ex c ise  ta x e s , and 
su r ta x  on income. I t  was th e  fundam ental o b jec tiv e  o f th e  movement fo r  a 
gen era l s a le s  ta x  to  l ig h te n  th e  ta x  burden o f th e  w e a lth ie r  c la s s  of s o c ie ty ." ^ l
West V irg in ia ’s gross s a le s  ta x  o f 1921 i n i t i a t e d  th e  modern s ta te  sa le s  
ta x  movement. This law imposed a o n e-ten th  p ercen t r a t e  on sa le s  o f e x tra c ted  
p ro d u c ts , a o n e - th ird  p ercen t r a te  on th e  "spread" o f w h o lesa le rs , and a 
tw o -ten th s  p ercen t r a te  on sa le s  by m anufacturers and r e t a i l e r s  and on p erso n a l 
and u t i l i t y  s e ry ic e s ; a l l  tax p ay ers  were allow ed a $10,000 exemption. No o th e r 
s t a t e  s a le s  tax es^ e re  enacted u n t i l  1929> when Georgia and M iss is s ip p i imposed 
g ross s a le s  ta x .  In  1933 > 12 s ta te s  tu rn ed  to  sa le s  tax es  as a  means o f 
e lim in a tin g  d e f i c i t s  which aro se  from th e  dep ression .
S evera l f a c to rs  s tim u la ted  th e  move: " ( l)  p ro p e rty  ta x  de linquencies ra n
high; (2) revenues from personal and corporate income were off; (3) needs 
for education and unemployment relief were mounting; (4) there was resistance 
to raising property tax rates— in fact some states applied limitations to such 
rates; and (5) some states were prevented from using income taxes by 
constitutuional restrictions. "52 Thus the states turned to the sales tax 
essentially as a last resort. This is in keeping with E.R.A. Seligman’s statement 
that "...the general sales tax constitutes the last resort of countries which 
find themselves in such fiscal difficulties that they must subordinate all 
other principles of taxation to that of adequacy. "53 Thirty-six States 
(including Indiana), the District of Columbia, and a large number of local 
governments now impose general sales taxes. Sales taxes are levied by local 
governments in twelve states. 54
D. The concept of sa le s  ta x a tio n . "The g en era l meaning of th e  concept of 
s a le s  ta x a t io n  i s  obvious, but a  p re c ise  d e f in i t io n  which draws a c le a r  l in e  of 
dem arkation between le v ie s  known as sa le s  tax es  and c lo se ly  r e la te d  tax es  i s  
more d i f f i c u l t  th an  might f i r s t  appear. The d e f in it io n  which o f fe rs  th e  most 
s a t i s f a c to ry  s ta tem nt in  term s o f common c u rren t term inology may be s ta te s  as 
fo llo w s : a s a le s  ta x  i s  a levy  imposed upon th e  s a le s , or elem ents in c id e n ta l
t o  th e  s a le s , such as re c e ip ts  Thom them of A ll or a  wide range of dommodities, 
exclud ing  tax es  imposed a t  f r a c t io n a l  r a te s  upon gross r e c e ip ts  in  th e  form of 
busin ess  occupation or l ic e n se  ta x e s . A sa le s  may be imposed upon a l l  t r a n s ­
a c tio n s  through which commodities pass or upon one or a sm all number o f s tages 
on ly . The ta x  qjay be confined to  p h y s ica l commodities, or i t  may apply  to  some 
o r a l l  s e rv ic e s  rendered  by commercial e n te rp r is e s ,  p ro fe s s io n s , e t c . ,  bu t no t 
s e rv ic e s  rendered  by workers to  th e i r  em ployers.
1 . S a les  v s . Excise Taxes. A s a le s  ta x ,  thus d efined , i s  somewhat 
a r b i t r a r i l y  d e lim ited  from two r e la te d  forms of le v ie s .  One i s  th e  type of ta x
imposed upon th e  s a le  of p a r t ic u la r  commodities or groups of commodities; 
th e se  may be c a l le d  s p e c ia l  or s e le c t iv e  sa le s  or commodity tax es  or exc ise  
ta x e s .  Although th e  l a t t e r  term  i s  sometimes confined to  p a r t ic u la r  forms 
o f s p e c ia l  s a le s  ta x e s , such as those  Imposed a t  th e  m anufacturing le v e l ,  or 
on th e  o th e r hand, extended to  a l l  tax es  imposed upon a c t i v i t i e s ,  as 
d is tin g u ish e d  from tax es  on p ro p erty  or p erso n s. A w idespread s p e c ia l s a le s  
o r ex c ise  ta x  system , o f co u rse , resem bles a s a le s  ta x ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  one w ith  
many exem ptions. But in  most c o u n tr ie s , a c tu a l  tax es  f a l l  c le a r ly  in to  one 
catego ry  or an o th e r.
2 . S ales v s . Gross R eceip ts  B usiness Taxes. The o th e r necessary  
l in e  of dem arkation is  th a t  between a s a le s  ta x  and a  business  occupation  
o r l ic e n s e  ta x  measured by g ross r e c e ip t s .  From th e  s tan d p o in t of th e  
s t r u c tu r e  of th e  ta x  and probable economic e f f e c t s ,  t h i s  type o f lev y  i s  
e s s e n t ia l ly  id e n t ic a l  w ith  a  s a le s  ta x .  The basic  d iffe re n c e  between th e
two i s  p r im a rily  one o f l e g i s l a t iv e  in t e n t  no t always r e f le c te d  in  th e  law,
and not always easy to  a s c e r ta in .  In  th e  case o f a s a le s  ta x ,  i t  i s  
presumed th a t  th e  ta x  w i l l  be s h if te d  forw ard to  th e  consumer; th e  business 
f irm  m erely being regarded as charge fo r  th e  p r iv i le g e  o f ca rry in g  on 
business  a c t i v i t y ,  and i s  presumably in tended  to  be a  burden on business  as 
such, and thus on i t s  owners, a lthough  a c tu a l ly ,  o f co u rse , such a ta x  i s  
l ik e ly  to  s h i f t  forw ard in  th e  same manner as a sa le s  ta x .  In  p ra c t ic e  th e  
major d iffe re n c e  between th e  two types o f le v ie s  i s  in  th e  le v e l  o f th e  r a t e ,  
th e  b usiness  occupation  tax es  in  v i r tu a l ly  a l l  cases having r a te s  which a re  a 
f r a c t io n  o f one p e r c e n t ." ^
E. Forms o f S a les  Taxes. S ales tax es  f a l l  in to  two g en e ra l c la s s e s :  th e
m u ltip le  s tag e  ta x  and th e  s in g le  s tag e  ta x .
1 . The m u ltip le  s tag e  ta x e s . Two w e ll known tax es  come under th e
m u ltip le  stage  c la s s i f ic a t io n :  ( l )  th e  tu rnover ta x ,  and (2) th e  value
added ta x . The tu rnover ta x  ap p lie s  to  a l l  t ra n sa c tio n s  through which 
commodities p ass , a t  a l l  p roduction  and d is t r ib u t io n  le v e ls .  The value 
added ta x . The tu rnover ta x  a p p lie s  to  a l l  tra n sa c tio n s  through which 
commodities p ass , a t  a l l  p roduction  and d is t r ib u t io n  le v e ls .  The value 
added ta x ,  which combines fe a tu re s  of both s in g le  and m u ltip le  s tag e  
ta x e s , a p p lie s  a t  each tra n s a c tio n , but only to  th e  value added ( s e l l in g
p r ic e  le s s  th e  co s t of tax ab le  goods).
a . The tu rnover ta x .
(1 ) Arguments p ro . A complete m u ltip le  s tag e  s a le s  ta x  
o f fe rs  th e  maximum p o ss ib le  y ie ld  a t  th e  low est r a t e .  This i s  a p o l i t i c a l  
advantage s ince  ta x  r a te s  a re  one of th e  fo c a l p o in ts  of p o l i t i c s .  Beyond 
p o l i t i c s  th e  low r a te  o f fe rs  le s s  in cen tiv e  fo r  ta x  evasion . The m u ltip le  
s tage  tax es  are  h igh ly  in e q u ita b le  as among various business firm s which
could cause a tendency towards evasion . Another claim ed advantage i s  th a t
th e  ta x  spreads th e  Impact among various types of business f irm s, in s te ad  of 
co n cen tra tin g  i t  on r e la t iv e ly  few firm s. This makes th e  impact p a tte rn
o f th e  tu rnover ta x  d isc rim in a to ry  thus s h if t in g  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  th an  under 
th e  s in g le  s tag e  ta x e s . The g re a te s t  argument fo r  th e  ta x  I s  th a t  i t  i s  sim ple 
and re q u ire s  no d is t in c t io n  to  be made between tax ab le  and non-taxab le  
t r a n s a c t io n s .
(2) Arguments con.
(a )
, Non-uniform ity of th e  consumer burden. The number of 
hand lers  in  th e  market channels and th e  vary ing  p r o f i t  margins o f various 
goods w i l l  cause th e  cumulated burden on various commodities to  c o n s ti tu te  
vary ing  percen tages of th e  r e t a i l  s e l l in g  p r ic e s  of th e  goods.
(b ) In te g ra tio n . S ince th e  ta x  a p p lie s  to  each s a le ,  th e
t o t a l  ta x  burden i s  le s s  when goods pass through in te g ra te d  market 
ch an n e ls .
(c )  Import goods a re  favored  r e la t iv e  to  domestic goods 
because no pre-im port ta x  i s  imposed. A problem e x is ts  in  r e la t io n  w ith  
e x p o rts , a lso  d ea lin g  m ostly w ith  refunds of p re -ex p o rt tax es  c o l le c te d .
There i s  g re a t d i f f i c u l ty  in  a s c e r ta in in g  th e  amount o f ta x  p a id .
(d ) A u n iv e rsa l tu rnover ta x  ap p lied  uniform ly w ith  a  low 
r a t e  would have many a d m in is tra tiv e  advantages. But th e  tax es  a re  never 
imposed in  pure form. P o l i t i c a l  p re ssu re  groups cause m o d ifica tio n  and 
s p e c ia l  trea tm en t which s e r io u s ly  com plicates th e  t a x . ^
b . The value-added ta x .
(1) Advantages. The value added ta x  of u n iv e rsa l scope 
o f fe r s  c e r ta in  advantages over th e  r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x .  The impact of th e  
ta x  i s  spread over a l l  f irm s , in s te a d  of being concen tra ted  on r e t a i l e r s  
th u s  le sse n in g  evasion  and com plain ts. Producer goods can be excluded 
more e a s i ly  a l le v ia t in g  in te rp r e ta t iv e  and compliance problem s.
(2 ) D isadvantages o f th e  ta x  a re : (a )  The number of 
tax p ay ers  i s  m u ltip lie d  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  and the  ta sk  of determ ining ta x  
l i a b i l i t y  i s  com plicated, compared to  a t ru e  s in g le  s tag e  ta x .  (b)
There i s  le s s  assurance o f complete s h if t in g  o f th e  ta x  forw ard to  
consumers, as th e  ta x  burden, a lthough  uniform  in  a l l  d i s t r ib u t io n  channels, 
s t r ik e s  th e  various firm s in  d i f f e r e n t  ways, (c ) I t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t
to  vary th e  burden on d i f f e r e n t  commodities, i f  t h i s  i s  d e s ira b le , and to  
p rov ide  exem ptions, because of th e  ta x  a t  more than  one s ta g e .57
2 . S in g le  s tag e  ta x e s . The s in g le  s ta g e  le v ie s  apply only once 
to  each commodity as i t  passes through production  and d is t r ib u t io n  
ch an n e ls . I t  may be le v ie d  a t  a s in g le  f l a t  r a te  upon a l l  goods or a  
g iven  le v e l  o f p ro d u c tio n . I t  i s  p o ss ib le  th e re fo re  to  have ( l )  a  man­
u f a c tu r e r s 1 s a le s  ta x ,  (2) a  w h o le sa le rs ’ s a le s  ta x ,  and ( 3) ® r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x .
a . M anufacturer’s s a le s  ta x .  The f i r s t  o f th e  th re e  le v e ls  fo r  
im p o sitio n  of a s in g le  s tag e  s a le s  ta x  I s  th a t  o f th e  s a le  by th e  
m anufacturer o f f in is h e d  p ro d u c ts ..  The b as ic  in te n t  of th e  ta x  s tru c tu re  
I s  to  apply  th e  ta x  to  s a le s  o f f in is h e d  goods by m anufacturers. To 
a t t a i n  t h i s  g o a l, a l l  m anufacturers a re  re q u ire d  to  o b ta in  l ic e n s e s ,  
whereas o th e r firm s a re  no t g ran ted  l ic e n s e s .  The ta x  norm ally a p p lie s  
when th e  s a le  i s  made by a l ic e n se d  m anufacturer to  an u n licen sed  buyer 
w h o le sa le r, r e t a i l e r ,  or f in a l  consumer.
(1 ) Advantages. The prim ary advantage of th e  use o f th e  
m anufacturing le v e l  in s te a d  o f a l l  p ro d u c tio n -d is tr ib u tio n  le v e ls  i s
th e  avoidance o f th e  in ce n tiv e s  toward in te g ra tio n  and th e  d isc r im in a tio n  
a g a in s t  n o n -in teg ra te d  f irm s . The sm all number o f payers f a c i l i t a t e s  th e  
o p e ra tio n  of exem ptions. No p a r t ic u la r  d i f f i c u l ty  i s  encountered in  
d e fin in g  th e  tax ab le  t ra n s a c t io n , and in  excluding  from th e  ta x  th e  s a le  
o f u n fin ish e d  manufactured goods.
(2 )  D isadvantages. "The m anufacturing le v e l  g iv es  r i s e  to  
one problem: th a t  o f  determ ining  ta x a b le  p r ic e  in  such a manner as to
avoid  in e q u ity  among firm s in  v arious d is t r ib u t io n  channels . This problem 
becomes more se rio u s  a s  d is t r ib u t io n  channels become more complex. Other 
c r i t ic is m s  a re : (a )  a c e r ta in  amount o f pyram iding alm ost has to  occur,
(b ) th e  f in a l  consumer I s  alm ost never aware o f  th e  ta x  elem ent in  th e  p r ic e ,  
and (c )  a h ig h er percen tage r a t e  i s  n ecessary  to  y ie ld  th e  same revenue th a t  
a lower r e t a i l  r a t e  w i l l  y i e l d . "5®
b. The w h o le sa le r’s s a le s  ta x .  The b asic  in te n t  i s  to  apply  th e  
ta x  on th e  l a s t  w holesale t r a n s a c t io n ,  th rough  which a  good p a sse s , th a t  i s ,  
on th e  s a le  to  th e  r e t a i l e r  w hether by a w ho lesaler or m anufacturer. The 
c h o ic e  o f  th e  w holesale le v e l  in  p re fe ren ce  to  th e  r e t a i l  le v e l  i s  made in  
an. e f f o r t  to  minimize th e  number o f taxpaying  f irm s , and to  e lim in a te  la rg e
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numbers of sm all f irm s. The w holesale le v e l  g re a tly  f a c i l i t a t e s  th e  a p p lic a tio n  
o f the  d i f f e r e n t ia te d  r a te  s tr u c tu re ,  which would be alm ost im possible i f  th e  
ta x  were c o lle c te d  from th e  r e t a i l e r s .  No p a r t ic u la r  problems a re  encountered 
xa q en u in g  th e  tax ab le  s a le .  As compared to  th e  m anufacturer’s s a le s  ta x ,  
th e  trea tm en t of both im ports and exports i s  f a c i l i t a t e d  and a  lower r a te  i s  
p o s s ib le .
(1) Advantages. The prim ary m erit o f th e  w holesale sa le s  
ta x  i s  i t s  p o te n t ia l i ty  as an instrum ent of in f la t io n  c o n tro l,  g re a te r ,  th an  
th a t  of any o th er ta x  except a p ro g ressiv e  r a te  spendings ta x . A high  r a te  
p rovides an e f fe c t iv e  in cen tiv e  to  c u r t a i l  consumption w ithout producing 
se rio u s  adverse e f fe c ts  on in cen tiv es  to  work; th u s  per d o lla r  of revenue i t  
should produce g re a te r  d e f la tio n a ry  e f f e c t  w ithout accompanying adverse 
e f f e c ts  on p roduction  than  income or u sual s a le s  ta x e s . The second m erit i s  th e  
avoidance o f th e  reg re ss iv en ess  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of u n ifo rm -ra te  comprehensive 
s a le s  ta x e s . F in a l ly ,  i t  excludes v i r tu a l ly  a l l  major p ro d u cers’ goods. By 
l im it in g  th e  ta x  to  sp e c if ie d  commodity groups, i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  exclude a l l  
item s purchased fo r  business use except those  of a  ch a rac te r  a lso  w idely 
purchased fo r  consumption purposes, such as o f f ic e  su p p lie s .
(2) D isadvantages. One problem w ith  th e  w holesale le v e l  
i s  th e  ex is ten ce  of some sm all sc a le  w holesalers a g a in s t which enforcement 
i s  d i f f i c u l t .  A second problem a r is e s  out o f conduct of both r e t a i l  and 
w holesale a c t iv i ty  by some f irm s. I t  i s  alm ost im possible fo r  them to  
aggregate  t h e i r  purchases between goods to  be so ld  a t  r e t a i l  and those  to  be
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re s o ld  a t  w h o lesa le .59
PART V. THE RETAIL SALES TAX.
A. In tro d u c tio n . The most im portant and most p rev a len t-S in g le  s tage  
s a le s  ta x  levy  from a source of revenue view point i s  th e  r e t a i l  s a le s  
ta x .  Perhaps more than  any o th er ta x ,  th e  s a le s  ta x  has been in troduced  
as a measure designed to  r a i s e  la rg e  sums o f money q u ick ly , under th e  
p ressu re  of f in a n c ia l  emergency. "R e ta il s a le s  tax es  have rece ived  a 
wide v a r ie ty  o f names, in c lud ing  p r iv i le g e  ta x e s , occupation ta x e s , 
consumer’s ta x e s , e x c ise s , p roduction  ta x e s , gross r e c e ip ts ,  tax es  or 
gross income ta x e s . L ikew ise, as a m atter of law they  a t ta c h  to  many i 
d i f f e r e n t  le g a l  s u b je c ts , such as e x e rc is in g  th e  p r iv ile g e  of engaging 
in  th e  business of s e l l in g  or producing, making s a le s ,  consummating 
c o n tra c ts  to  s e l l ,  ex e rc is in g  th e  p r iv i le g e  o f purchasing , s to r in g  or 
u s in g , or f in a l ly  th e  a c t  o f purchasing  or s e l l in g .  To th ese  may be 
added th e  fu rn ish in g  of various p u b lic  u t i l i t y  and o th er se rv ic e s , 
in c lu d in g  amusements, rad io  b ro ad castin g , and th e  l ik e  th a t  may no t be 
considered  "sa le s"  w ith in  th e  le g a l  d e f in i t io n .  The common fa c to r  in  
a l l  th e se  outwardly d iv e rse  tax es  i s  th e  economic p ro p erty  th a t  th e  
amount of th e  payable i s  produced by a constan t r a te  ap p lied  to  th e  
volume or value o f commodities or s e rv ic e s  tra n s fe r re d  or exchanged.
I t  bears a d i r e c t ly  p ro p o rtio n a l r e la t io n s h ip  to  th e  gross amount o f 
business a c t iv i ty  and has no fu n c tio n a l r e la t io n  to  p r o f i t s ,  c a p i ta l  
investm ent or o th er economic f a c t o r s . T h e  ex trao rd in a ry  broad base 
p o ss ib le  w ith  such a ta x  allow s th e  a tta inm en t o f a very  s u b s ta n tia l  
y ie ld ,  even a t  r e la t iv e ly  low r a t e s .  T h irty -sev en  s ta te s  (in c lu d in g  
In d ia n a ) , th e  D is t r i c t  o f Columbia, and a  la rg e r  number of lo c a l  govern­
ments now impose g en era l s a le s  ta x e s . Most o f th e  s ta t e  sa le s  tax es  
a r e  s in g le -s ta g e  tax es  applying to  sa le s  o f ta n g ib le  p ersonal p ro p erty  a t
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r e t a i l  and to  sp e c if ie d  s e rv ic e s . T o ta l s ta te  sa le s  ta x  c o lle c tio n s  in  19^1 
were $4,509 m illio n  which was 23.7  p e rcen t o f a l l  s t a t e  ta x  c o lle c tio n s  fo r  
t h a t  year and 31.7 p ercen t of th e  t o t a l  ta x  revenues o f s ta te s  levy ing  sa le s  
t a x e s . ^
V irg in ia  i s  not a r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x  s ta te  but th re e  m u n ic ip a litie s  
H orfo lk , V irg in ia  Beach, and B r is to l  levy  r e t a i l  sa le s  ta x e s . B r is to l  has 
a  f u l l  th re e  percen t lev y  w ith  exemptions w hile th e  o th e r two have sev ere ly  
l im ite d  laws e i th e r  as to  su b jec t or as to  r a t e .
R e ta i l  s a le s  tax es o f th e  American s ta te s  g en era lly  a re  based on 
s a le s  of " ta n g ib le  p ersonal p ro p e rty ” a t  r e t a i l  and on th e  fu rn ish in g  of 
some se rv ice s  to  consumers. R e ta i l  s a le s  a re  defined , fo r  ta x  purposes, as 
s a le s  fo r  purposed of use o r consumption, r a th e r  than  fo r  r e s a le .  Sales 
fo r  r e s a le ,  which a re  f re e  of ta x ,  include those of goods purchased fo r  th e  
purpose o f r e s a le  in  unchanged form, and, under what i s  c a lle d  th e  p h y sica l 
in g re d ie n t r u le ,  s a le s  o f goods, such as m a te r ia ls , and p a r t s ,  which w i l l  
become p h y s ic a lly  inco rpo ra ted  in to  goods which w i l l  be so ld . The ta x  no t 
only ap p lie s  to  sa le s  to  in d iv id u a l consumers fo r  personal u se , bu t a lso  
to  s a le s  of machinery, equipment, su p p lie s , and o th er item s to  business 
f irm s , s in ce  th ese  item s do no t become p h y s ic a lly  embodied in  th e  products 
o f th e  firm .
The tax es  a re  ap p lied  to  th e  sa le s  of ta n g ib le  p erso n a l p ro p erty ; th u s  
r e a l  and in ta n g ib le  p ro p erty  i s  u n iv e rsa lly  excluded, as w ell as s e rv ic e s , 
except as s p e c if ic a l ly  inc luded , A number of s ta te s  confine th e  le v ie s  
s t r i c t l y  to  commodities, bu t many include a few s e rv ic e s , p a r t ic u la r ly  p u b lic  
u t i l i t y  s e rv ic e s , amusements, and h o te l and motel r e n ta l s .  (The c i ty  of 
V irg in ia  Beach le v ie s  a 3 p ercen t ta x  on th e  t o t a l  amount p a id  fo r  board, 
an d /o r lodg ing  by o r fo r  any t r a n s ie n t  a t  any h o te l  o r motel in  th e  c i ty ;
The C ity  of N orfolk  le v ie s  th e  r e t a i l  ta x  on h o te l  and./ or motel accomodations 
f o r  t r a n s ie n ts  a t  a 2 p ercen t r a t e . )  A sm all group o f s ta te s  extends th e  
ta x  a ls o  to  charges fo r  s to ra g e , dry c lea n in g , r e p a ir  s e rv ic e s ,  and s im ila r  
item s. As a consequence a  major p a r t  o f consumers ex p en d itu res  escapes th e  
ta x .
B. The case fo r  th e  r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x .
1 . Advantages. The case fo r  r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x a t io n  r e s t s  on s e v e ra l 
prim ary c o n s id e ra tio n s : ( l )  th e  g en era l arguments fo r  an ex p en d itu res  ta x
as  considered  on page 30> (2 ) th e  c o n s id e ra tio n  th a t  a  s a le s  ta x  appears 
to  be th e  most f e a s ib le  means o f reach in g  persons on th e  b a s is  o f 
e x p e n d itu re s , w ith o u t th e  d isc r im in a to ry  e f f e c ts  o f e x c is e s ; and ( 3 ) th e  
a d m in is tra t iv e  advantages r e l a t iv e  to  th e  income ta x  (a )  fo r  reach in g  
persons who escape, income ta x a t io n  and (b ) fo r  use by s ta te s  and lo c a l i t i e s  
in  a f e d e ra l  system . F i r s t ,  th e  argument fo r  th e  expend itu res  ta x  b a s is  was 
ev a lu a ted  on page and need no t be rep ea ted  h e re . Secondly, i f  th e  use o f 
th e  ex p en d itu res  b a s is  i s  d e s ire d , i t  must be g ran ted  th a t  th e  r e t a i l  s a le s  
ta x  i s  a d m in is tra tiv e ly  more f e a s ib le  than  th e  spendings ta x .  T h ird ly , th e  
r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x  i s  an e f fe c t iv e  means o f reach in g  th o se  persons who escape 
income ta x  l i a b i l i t y  by le g a l  or i l l e g a l  means.
The r e t a i l  s a le s  tax e s  o f fe r  s ig n i f ic a n t  advantages fo r  s t a t e  and
s im ila r  u n its  o f governments in  o th e r coun tries*  They can a d m in is te r .s a le s
ta x e s  more e a s i ly  th an  income ta x e s , and th e re  i s  le s s  fe a r  th a t  th e  form er
w i l l  d r iv e  people and b u sin ess  out of th e  s t a t e .  "With h igh  f e d e ra l  income 
«
ta x e s  th e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  o b s ta c le s  in  th e  way of h igh  s ta t e  income 
ta x e s  a re  s u b s ta n t ia l ;  i f  th e  s ta t e s  a re  to  r e t a in  f in a n c ia l  autonomy, 
th ey  a re  v i r tu a l ly  compelled to  tu rn  to  th e  s a le s  t a x . "^3
2 . Proponents o f th e  ta x .  A nalysis  o f th e  support g iven  th e  s a le s  ta x  
i s  a  complex problem . In  v ario u s  s ta t e s  and' a t  v ario u s  tim es w e ll-d ire c te d
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campaigns have been undertaken by farm  groups, te a c h e r ^  groups, urban 
r e a l  e s ta te  a s so c ia tio n s , pub lic  se rv ic e  co rp o ra tio n s , and lo c a l  govern­
mental a u th o r i t ie s .  Much o f t h e i r  a c t iv i ty  has been d ire c te d  to  fo rc in g  
measures l im it in g  th e  ta x  r a te s  on p ro p e rty , or p lac in g  a g re a tly  
in creased  share of th e  ed u ca tio n a l co s ts  upon th e  s ta te  government. A 
d i r e c t  l in k  between th e  levy ing  of a  r e t a i l  sa le s  ta x  and red u c tio n  or 
fre e z in g  o f p ro p erty  ta x  r a te s  may be th e  reason  fo r  support o f th e  t^ x  
by farm ers. I t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  term  farmer may be synonymous w ith  
la n d lo rd . D.C. Coyle i s  h arsh  in  h is  c r i t ic is m  o f th is ;  p o in t .  "Sometimes 
a  s ta te  i s  pursuaded to  adopt a r s a le s  ta x  so as to  r e l ie v e  th e  burden of 
r e a l  e s ta te  ta x e s .  The r ic h  man w ith  la rg e  p roperty  and a la rg e  income w i l l  
save more on h is  p roperty  ta x  th an  he w i l l  pay on a s a le s  t a x . " ^  Urban 
r e a l  e s ta te  in te r e s t s  a re  a lso  su p p o rte rs  of th e  ta x  along w ith  a 
m iscellany  o f u t i l i t y ,  m anufacturing, and mining co rp o ra tio n s  u su a lly  
through th e i r  n a tio n a l and s ta tew ide  o rg an iz a tio n s . The n a tio n a l 
A sso c ia tio n  o f M anufacturers i s  a vociferous advocate of a F ederal r e t a i l  
s a le s  ta x .
Support fo r  th e  s a le s  ta x  a lso  comes from those  who stand  to  b e n e f it  
from th e  money to  be spent therefrom . The most s tro n g ly  organized a re  
th e  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  o f th e  school system: Teachers, school supply in t e r e s t s ,
ed u ca tio n a l a s so c ia tio n s  and p a re n ts  o f school c h ild re n . An argument used 
to  support th e  re c e n t V irg in ia  b id  fo r  a s ta t e  r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x  was th a t  of 
t in .  o b ta in in g  spme revenue from th e  la rg e ,  s tand ing  group of t r a n s ie n ts ,  
m ostly m il i ta ry  personnel, who l iv e  in  V irg in ia  but own no p ro p erty  h e re , and 
who m ain tain  le g a l  resid en ce  elsew here, th u s , escaping both V irg in ia  r e a l ty  
tax es  and income ta x e s . There a re  about 56,500 m il i ta ry  personnel s ta tio n e d  
th roughout V irg in ia  w ith  a t o t a l  annual p a y ro ll o f  $332 m i l l i o n .
C. The case a g a in s t th e  s a le s  ta x .
1 . D isadvantages. O bjections to  th e  use of r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x a tio n s  
a re  l i s t e d  under two headings: ( l )  e q u ity , and (2) economic e f f e c t s .
a .  E quity . The most s ig n i f ic a n t  arguments a g a in s t s a le s  ta x e s  
a re  th o se  based on eq u ity  c o n s id e ra tio n s . The ta x  favo rs  those  persons 
who accum ulate as  savings unu su ally  h igh  percen tages o f t h e i r  income.
In  a d d it io n , u n lik e  th e  spendings ta x ,  i t  i s  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  to  make 
th e  o v e r -a l l  burden p ro g ress iv e  by adjustm ent in  th e  r a t e  s t r u c tu r e ,  and 
i f  th e  ta x  i s  ap p lied  uniform ly to  a l l  consumption ex p en d itu res, i t  i s  l i k e ly  
to  be r e g re s s iv e .  On th e  average, th e  la rg e r  th e  income, th e  g re a te r  th e  
p ercen tage  o f income which w i l l  be saved, and, w ith  th e  u su a l forms of s a le s  
ta x  which excludes most s e rv ic e s , th e  g re a te r  th e  percen tage o f income 
sp en t on non-taxab le  s e rv ic e s .  Those w ith  sm all income spend p r a c t ic a l ly  a l l  
o f t h e i r  earn ings on consumption item s. (See Table number 2«) (See a lso  
f ig u re  number 2 .)
b . Economic e f f e c t s .  In  a d d itio n  to  th e  charge o f re g re ss iv e n e ss  
th e  d is t r ib u t io n  o f th e  burden of a s a le s  ta x  i s  su b je c t to  c r i t ic i s m  in  
o th e r r e s p e c ts .  In  g en e ra l, th e  ta x e s , which cannot, fo r  a d m in is tra tiv e  and 
p o l i t i c a l  rea so n s , be made to  apply to  a l l  consumption ex p en d itu res , fav o r 
th o se  persons whose expend itu res co n cen tra te  h ea v ily  on untaxed item s, such 
as p e rso n a l s e rv ic e s , fo re ig n  t r a v e l ,  o r expensive lo d g in g s. On th e  o th e r hand 
th e  ta x  d isc r im in a te s  a g a in s t persons whose circum stances compel them to  spend 
d isp ro p o r tio n a te ly  h igh  percen tages o f t h e i r  incomes fo r  ta x a b le  purposes.
Thus la rg e  fa m ilie s  a re  d isc rim in a ted  a g a in s t,  as compared to  sm alle r fa m ilie s  
w ith  comparable incomes. A lthough th e  former have l e s s ,  r a th e r  th an  more, 
taxpay ing  a b i l i t y ,  they  pay more ta x .  (See F igure number 2 .)  Food exemption 
le s s e n s  th e  d isc r im in a tio n , because a h igh  percen tage o f expend itu res  o f th e
TABLE NUMBER 9.
Approximate dollar amount per $1000 of income a Sale's Tax takes from different 
Income groups.
INCOME LEVEL 2i  TAX 3 i» TAX
1000 - 2000 11.72 17.58
2000 - 3000 9.88 11+.82
3000 - 5000 8.58 12.87
5000 - 10,000 7.86 11.79
10,00 - 25,000 6 .3^ 9.51
25,000 - 50,000 Ij-.H 6.66
50,000 - 100,000 3.68 5.52
100,000 - 150,000 3.10 4.65
150,000 - 300,000 2.1*2 3.63
300,000 - 500,000 .81* 1.26
500,000 - 1,000,000 .50 .75
Source: Harold M. Groves, Financing Government, p. 321
la rg e  fa m ilie s  i s  made fo r  food. F in a l ly ,  to  th e  ex ten t to  which sa le s  ta x e s , 
in  g e n e ra l, b ring  about wage in c re a se s , th e  f in a l  d is t r ib u t io n  of th e  burden 
i s  l ik e ly  to  be h igh ly  cap ric io u s  and u n re la te d  to  d es ired  s tandards of e q u ity .
e . Opponents to  th e  ta x .  bu ring  th e  * 3©*s when th e  s a le s  ta x  was 
h u r r ie d ly  adopted by l e g i s la tu r e s ,  r e t a i l  merchants and la b o r  unions were th e  
major opposing groups. In  many s ta te s  th e  r e t a i l e r s  were v i r tu a l ly  a lo n e .
The r e t a i l e r s  were th e  most organized and th e  lo u d est but in  most cases 
oppostion  was to  no a v a i l .  P re se n tly  r e t a i l e r s  f in d  th e  ta x  to  be l i t t l e  more 
th a n  a nuisance once they  become accustomed to  i t ,  and unions g en e ra lly  r e a l iz e  
th a t  i t  i s  th e  only f e a s ib le  method by which th e  s ta te s  can fin an ce  d e s ired  
a c t i v i t i e s .  Consumers as an organized  voice were r a r e ly  heard  in  form al p r o te s t .
D. Incidence o f th e  r e t a i l  s a le s  ta x .  The a n a ly s is  of s h if t in g  and incidence 
i s  e s s e n t ia l ly  an a p p lic a tio n  o f th e  th eo ry  of p r ic e  and ou tpu t determ ination  
to  th e  re a c tio n s  which occur in  response to  an in c rease  in  c o s t ,  s in ce  th e  
ta x  c o n s ti tu te s  an a d d itio n  to  th e  c o s ts  of th e  firm s upon which i t  i s  le v ie d .
The " in c id en ce” of a  ta x  i s  defined  to  be upon those  who bear i t s  d ir e c t  money 
burden. "S h iftin g "  r e fe r s  to  th e  p rocess  o f ad justm ent, as a  r e s u l t  of which a 
burden i s  t r a n s fe r re d  from one person to  an o th e r. S a les  tax es  may impose burdens 
on persons in  o th e r c a p a c it ie s  th an  as  consumers, and in  amounts le s s  (o r  even 
g re a te r )  th a n  th e  amount o f ta x a tio n  o f p a r t ic u la r  t ra n s a c t io n s ;  and a burden 
borne a t  one p e rio d  fo llow ing  im p o sitio n  of a s a le s  ta x  i s  o f te n  th ru s t  backward 
o r forw ard to  some o th er p a r ty  a f t e r  th e  lap se  of tim e.
When a t a x . i s  imposed upon th e  s a le s  o f a firm , t h i s  ta x  c o n s ti tu te s  a 
d i r e c t  in c re a se  in  th e  expenses of th e  f irm , one which v a r ie s  in  d i r e c t  
r e la t io n s h ip  to  s a le s  of taxed  a r t i c l e s  and one which must be c u r re n tly  met.
The re a c tio n s  o f th e  firm s w i l l  depend in  la rg e  measure upon th e  n a tu re  of 
co m p etitio n  in  th e  markets in  which th e  firm s are  s e l l in g  and must be analyzed
in  term s of th e se  market ty p e s . &&
1 . P urely  com petitive  m arket. I f  a ta x  i s  le v ie d  upon a  commodity 
so ld  in  a  p u re ly  com petitive m arket, th e  in d iv id u a l s e l l e r s  cannot d i r e c t ly  
s h i f t  th e  burden o f th e  ta x  from them selves. Thus, i f  a ta x  were le v ie d  upon 
th e  sa le s  o f a  wheat p roducer, he ^o u ld  no t be enabled thereby  to  in c rease  
th e  p r ic e  he re c e iv e s  fo r  h is  w heat. Some market p r ic e  adjustm ents w i l l  
occur th rough  changes in  market supply; when th e  s e l l e r  re c e iv in g  a lower 
p r ic e  fo r  h is  goods w i l l  p lace  fewer goods on th e  m arket.
Moving from th e  market p erio d  to  th e  sh o rt run co n d itio n , downward 
adjustm ent in  ou tpu t w i l l  occur as firm s r e s to r e  e q u a li ty  o f m arginal c o s t 
and p r ic e .  A p o r tio n  of th e  ta x  i s  now borne by p u rch ase rs , a  p o r tio n  by 
th e  owners o f th e  business e n te rp r is e  and o th er f a c to r  owners who a re  unable 
to  withdraw th e i r  f a c to r  u n its  from th e  in d u s try  in  th e  sh o rt run  p e rio d .
Over th e  long run  p e r io d , more complex s h i f t in g  becomes p o ss ib le  as some firm s 
q u it  th e  in d u s try  because they  a re  not making a normal r e tu rn .  U ltim a te ly ,
a l l  th e  ta x  burden must be s h if te d  from th e  owner o f  th e  businesses and an
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2 . Complete monopoly. At th e  o th er extreme in  th e  range o f th e  com petitive  
c o n d itio n s  i s  com plete monopoly. Immediate p r ic e  adjustm ent i s  l ik e ly  as th e  
m onopolist r e s to r e s  e q u a lity  of m arginal c o s t and m arginal revenues. P r ic e  w i l l  
be in c rea sed . With co n s tan t m arginal c o s t th e  p r ic e  w i l l  r i s e  by le s s  th an  th e  
amount o f th e  ta x , s in ce  average revenue w i l l  r i s e  le s s  th an  m arginal revenue. 
Output w i l l  be reduced s u f f ic ie n t ly  to  r a i s e  m arginal revenue by th e  amount
o f th e  ta x  s in c e  m arginal c o s t i s  r a is e d  by th i s  amount. A p o r tio n  o f th e  ta x  
w i l l  r e s t  upon th e  consumer, a  p o r tio n  on th e  re c e iv e rs  of th e  monopoly p r o f i t s .
The e x ten t of th e  p r ic e  in c re a se s  w i l l  depend on th e  n a tu re  o f th e  
m onopolists demand schedule a t  le v e ls  above th e  o ld  p r ic e  and on th e  behavior
of original cost in the range in which the firm is operating* Price 
increase will be greater if marginal cost is decreasing than if it is 
increasing, since the necessary output reduction will be greater. With 
increasing! marginal cost the price increase will be greater, the more in­
elastic the demand; with decreasing cost the reverse is true. With 
constant marginal costs, elasticity of demand does not affect shifting.
In a cost situation a sharp decrease in elasticity above the old price 
will encourage shifting, because once the firm gets into this relatively 
inelastic range, a substantial price increase, perhaps in excess of the 
tax, is profitable.7^
3. Non-purely competitive conditions.. The typical market situation 
today is characterized neither by pure competition nor by complete monopoly,
I
but by intermediate ones, which may be called non-purely competitive 
conditions. The typical case is that characterized by oligopoly in one 
degree or another. Firms, in reacting to changes in cost, will typically 
not disregard the probable responses of competing firms to the changes in 
costs and the readjustments they make in their own prices. Under such cir?- 
cumstances some initial price increase, will be made on every product, 
except in the cases in which the average or marginal revenue curve appears 
perfectly elastic above the old price. On the whole, oligopoly is characterized
by direct and immediate shifting; the burden of a tax on output or sales is
passed directly on to the consumer and thus borne in proportion to consumption
expenditures on, the taxed product..
There are, however, modifications which alter the results indicated 
above. In the first place certain retail pricing phenomena will interfere.
One of these Is customary prices. Prices on certain articles maintained over 
long periods can be altered only with great difficulty. That is retailers
realize that average revenue will fall greatly if the price is distrubed. 
Likewise the absence of sufficiently small coin denominations will prevent 
the tax from being collected on items of small unit value. Another feature 
is the existence of price lines. Experience has shown that some goods sell 
best in certain definite price lines; it will commonly be felt desirable to 
avoid any price changes which Involve readjustments of class lines.
A further group of factors rigidifying retail prices includes the 
existence of "suggested retail prices" by manufacturers, actual resale price 
maintenance, and legal price control. In the first two instances it seems 
likely that ordinarily the manufacturer will readjust the retail price to 
include the tax. With legal control of prices, the price ordinarily is set 
on a "cost" basis: the tax, as an element of cost, would in general be
adjusted in exact amount to the price. Since all firms as forced to act in 
unison, complete shifting is more certain then under other conditions.
A more significant phenemonen involves the possibility of the failure 
of certain firms in the field to raise prices by the full amount of the tax. 
Any firm can gain from; price cutting in the new situation after all have 
increased. In retailing, with a high percentage of common and fixed cost, 
especially great possibilities of gain from price cutting exist. The danger 
always exist, however, that some firms, especially those emphasizing high 
turnover and low margins at all times, will attempt to escape from the tax 
by selling an increased volume of goods. If the firm does not raise prices 
initially, its .demand curve will shift to the right, at the old price more 
goods can be sold, and the original level of profits maintained or even 
Increased. - If only a small number of firms attempt to act in this manner, 
they may be able to do so without interference, as the rest of the firms, 
not experiencing serious demand losses, avoid following in order to prevent
7^.
a general price collapse. But if a number of other firms follow the price 
cut because they experience a greater demand reduction than expected, a 
general loss in profits will result, leading to failure of some firms, 
exodus, and eventual price increase with a reduced number of enterprises.
It is because of this extreme importance of uniform action for full 
increases to occur without exodus that the provisions of laws requiring 
shifting are important. Such laws do not make absorption of the tax 
impossible, inasmuch as merchants can reduce prices by the amount of the tax.
But a powerful psychological force is added to the elements facilitating shifting. 
The force of inertia now favors shifting. Further, such laws may lessen 
consumer resistence to the tax, giving less, advantage than expected to those 
who cut prices. This is not necessarily the case; with separate charging, 
the consumer is made aware of the tax much more so than he would otherwise be.
But if he is aware of the law, he realizes that the retailer is expected by 
law to pass on the tax, and may make less effort to find a seller who will 
absorb the tax.
Under pure competition conditions such laws are futile since no 
firm can raise its prices at all until some firms leave the industry: with
pure monopoly, and optimum pricing, they would not accomplish their purpose 
since the monopolist would reduce his net price. But under non-purely 
competitive conditions, where not only the amount of short-run increase, 
but also the extent of exodus of firms, and the longrun incidence, depend 
on the strengthening of oligopoly elements, any factors which promote common 
action will aid short-run price increases, lessen the need for exodus, and 
cause greater long run price increases than would otherwise be the case. In 
other words firms in the industry would be driven to price fixing and market 
sharing.
E. Changes in employment and factor prices. The controversial aspects of 
the question of shifting and Incidence of a sales tax center around the 
potential effects upon the general level of factor prices. There are several 
points of view on the question, the differences arising primarily from the 
nature of the assumptions made about the use of the: funds collected from the 
tax, and the precise meaning given to the concept of incidence.
1. Real factor demand. The traditional approach Is based upon the 
assumption that the governmental expenditures of the funds insures that there 
is no net decline in actual demand for factor units. The tax revenues are 
employed by the government to acquire factor units, the governmental demand 
replaces the private sector demand lost because of the higher commodity 
prices, and thus there are not general deflationary influences upon factor 
prices. Firms increase prices in response to the tax; fewer goods are 
purchased, and thus fewer factor units are used in private sector production, 
but these factors are used either directly by government or in producing goods 
which the government needs. If the government pursues a general over-all 
policy of maintaining full employment, as is a reasonable assumption, the 
general level of factor prices is maintained, and the tax is borne in relation 
to consumer spending. There may be shifting of relative demands for various 
types of specialized factors, since the government demands for particular 
factors are different from those of the private sector, thus some shifting 
of relative factor prices will occur as a result of the over-all expenditure 
and tax program, but this reaction is best regarded as not being an element 
in the picture of sales tax incidence, but a result of the over-all fiscal 
program.73
2. General factor urice decline. A
On the other hand, Earl Rolph and others, have long argues that a sales
tax is not shifted to consumers. This conclusion is reached as a result of
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ignoring the use of the revenues collected by the government. Under their 
assumptions, and further simplifying assumptions of pure competition in 
factor and commodity markets and perfectly inelastic supplies of each type 
o f  faster, the eenelusien that the iaat will be berm fa a fhShfen
proportional to factor incomes received, and thus identical in incidence to 
a proportional income tax. The basic objection to this point of view is the 
improper assumption about use of funds. Since use must be made of the tax revenue 
collected; it may be used to finance additional expenditures, to replace another 
tax, or to retire debt. The most realistic assumption is that the money is spent 
on goverment activities. A goverment undertakes an activity and requires facter 
units for this purpose; it:'imposes a sales tax to provide the funds to acquire 
the factor units, and thus to reduce private sector demand for the factor units. 
The real burden is the loss of these factor units for private sector production. 
The tax determines the pattern by which this burden is distributed in the economy. 
Thus the assumption that real factor demand is maintained is a much more 
satisfactory one than one which ignores the use of the funds.72
3. Decline in employment. Suppose that as a result of the sales 
tax method of financing, the level of employment does fall below the level 
prevailing prior to the introduction of the tax and use of the funds. This may 
occur, if the tax is used to replace an income tax or for purposes of debt 
retirement. Should this decline be considered to result from the tax, and 
are those workers who lose their jobs bearing a portion of the burden of the 
tax through the loss of their incomes. Or is this loss a product of the 
over-all fiscal policy involved? This is largely definitional; but on the whole, 
it would appear to be satisfactory to regard the loss in employment as a 
consequence of the overall program, and pot an element in the burden of the tax.
b. Tax induced increases in factor prices. The imposition of the retail 
sales tax may raise factor prices through the effect of the initial increases
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in commodity prices upon the cost of living. Wages particularly may be 
affected. At the present time, many labor contracts contain escalator 
clauses. When a sales tax is introduced and prices rise, wages covered 
by these contracts will automatically rise, Even without such contracts 
the higher cost of living tends to encourage unions to demand higher 
wages. If the wage increases take place, the prices of the commodities 
produced tend t© rise, and the tax burden is in part shifted from the 
groups of workers who succeed in getting higher wages to other groups.
If the tendency is widespread, much @f the burden will come back again t@ 
the same groups of workers in the form ©f higher prices, and some furtner 
wage adjustments may occur. The net result is t® concentrate a greater 
share of the burden on those income groups which are least able to obtain 
income increases when the cost of living rises.7^
F'. Yield from sales taxes. T©tal revenues collected in 1952 were #7 million 
which constituted 0,4 percent of. the total state revenue collected. In i960 
the total revenue from the general sales tax was #4,509 millions which 
constituted 25.7 percent ©f' the total state tax collections. (See Table 
number 11.) Tax rates vary from a high of 5 percent t© a l©w 01 2 percent. 
(See Table number 12.)
G. Use Taxes,
1. Nature and purpose. The experience ©f the states with general sales 
taxes indicates that it is desirable to supplement them with use taxes upon 
articles where they are used, consumed, or stored. These use taxes are a 
device designed to reach transactions which would otherwise go tax-free as 
being made in interstate commerce. Residents of the sales tax states g© 
bargain hunting outside the state to a less tax-burdened market for their 
major purchases. They will likely continue to make minor purchases in-state.
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TABLE NUMBER II
State tax collections by source, selected years 1932 - 1961 
(Millions of dollars)
XEAR REVENUE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DISTRIBUTION
1932 $ 7 . 4*
1942 632 16 .25s
1952 2,229 22 . 65s
1956 3,036 22 .75s
1957 3,373 2 3 .25s
1958 3,507 23.5?S
1959 3,697 23.35S
i 960 4,302 23.95S
1961 4,509 23.79S
Source: Tax Overlapping In the United States* 1961, 3
TABLE NUMBER 12 
^Percentage distribution of State Sales Tax rates: 1964
RATE
PERCENT % 4# 3.5# Jjo 2 .%  2,2% 2$
No. of
States 1 6 2 17 1 10
*37 States and the District of Columbia
Source: C.C.H., Master Tax Guide - 1964, p.30
The unfortunate result of such extra-state bargain hunting is not merely a 
short changing of the state's treasury, but local merchants whose transactions 
are subject to the local sales tax may find themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage with an extra-state seller who is not burdened with any 
equivalent tax.
2. Imposition. Most of the states imposing general sales taxes also 
impose use taxes, ordinarily incorporating them in the general sales tax law. 
Compensating use tax statutes take the form of a levy on the local privilege 
of using property within the taxing state, which would have been subject to a 
sales tax had the,property been purchased within the taxing state. The 
compensating use tax rate is the same as the local sales tax levy, and 
privision is made that no articles on which a sales or use tax has been paid 
shall again be subject to the use tax. Apparently one of the purposes and 
certainly one of the results, of the compensating use tax is to help the retail 
sellers in the taxing state to compete upon terms of equality with retail 
dealers in other states who are exempt from a sales tax or any corresponding 
tax burdens. Another tendency of the use tax is to avoid the liklihood of a 
drain upon the revenue of the state by removing from buyers the temptation to 
place their orders in other states in an effort to avoid payment of the tax
on local sales.
As a practical matter there is no ordinary means of checking out-of-state 
purchases except for goods requiring a state registration or license, such as 
automobiles, boats, trailers, etc. Thus, the revenues from use taxes are 
relatively low In comparison with sales tax receipts, but they do stop sales 
tax avoidance to some extent and may also equalize the taxation of domestic 
and imported subjects.
3. Defects. The use tax has two major defects: (l) incomplete collection
and (2) discrimination against trade between the states. In Helsen and 
Randolph v. Kentucky the Kentucky Supreme Court faced the problem of the 
validity of use taxes as applied to articles used in interstate commerce.
Here Kentucky attempted to tax gasoline weed to power an iatorstate ferry.
The Court struck down the tax saying "If a tax cannot be laid by a state 
upon the interstate transportation of the subjects of commerce...such a 
tax cannot be laid upon the medium by which such transportation if effected." 
Articles acquired or transported in interstate commerce may be subjected, 
when once they are at rest, either at the end of their interstate trans­
portation or when they are at rest during a break in the trip for the business 
purpose of the owner, to a levy upon the privilege of local use of the goods.
The defect of ijicomplete collection remains because the United States 
Supreme Court in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland classified the practice of 
requiring the out of state vendor to collect the tax a violation of the 
"due process clause" unless the vendor is engaged in an "aggresive soliciting
77operation within the taxing state".
H. Legal Problems. Virtually all the present state sales taxes bear 
evidence of hasty drafting and verbatim copying from statutes and regulations 
of other states. The Federal Constitution implies that the state may not 
tax interstate commerce without the consent of Congress, which has thus far 
been witheld. Another constitutional question is that of jurisdiction. Under 
the "due process clause" of the Federal Constitution, it is held that a state 
may not tax persons, property, or activities over which it has no jurisdiction. 
This problem arises when, during the negotiation of the sale, the buyer is in 
on state, the seller in another, and the goods in either of the two states or 
in a third. It may be difficult to determine when the consummation of the 
sale took place.
A third constitututional problem is based on the implied prohibition of 
state taxation of the Federal Government or its instrumentalities. This 
immunity was rigidly enforced up to the 1930*s* Since then a more liberal
attitude toward tax liability by government sub-contractors has been prevalent.
The tax is considered part of the cost of production thereby causing the 
Federal government to bear the tax especially in so-called "cost plus fixed fee 
contracts". Many state constitutions also contain "uairormlty", "due process", 
and "equal protection" clauses that may invalidate the use of sales taxes in 
many area.
I. Exemption. There are, generally speaking, three broad areas of exemptions 
under statutes imposing sales and use taxes in the United States. They are:
(a) Exemptions arising out of the immunities of governmental agencies and 
instrumentalities, or out of the exercise of governmental functions, (b) Exemptions 
arising under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, (c) Specific 
exemptions created out of governmental taxing policies or social economic consider­
ations. Each of these areas of exemptions has grown up somewhat haphazardly 
over a substantial period of time, and very largely as the result of shifting 
judicial opinion, rather than as a matter of consistent legislative policy.79
1. Exemptions arising from governmental immunities and functions.
a. Federal Government. Although no provisions in the Constitution 
prohibits taxing sales to the Federal Government the courts have read an 
implied restriction into that instrument and have negated all attempts to collect 
the tax on sales made to the Federal Government. It is agreed by most state 
taxing authorities that this immunity is extended to Federal agencies. The most 
difficult cases usually arise through contracting and sub-contracting work done 
for Federal Governmental agencies. A valid tax depends upon the wording df the
m
particular federal statute which creates the agency. Another source of confusion 
is the varying definition of governmental agency. The American Red Cross is a 
government agency in Georgia but not in other sales tax states. The principle 
to be followed is that the state should not by taxation hamper or burden activities 
that it presently or potentialy may perform in furthering the common welfare. The
state legislatures have over the years and from time to time expressly recognized 
this principle by the enactment of specific provisions granting the exemption 
in more or less uniform statutory language. For this reason in recent years 
thor© has emargoa a tsrena by the courts both state and federal, toward more 
homogeneity in their decisions.
b. Sales to the state and its political subdivisions. This
exemption is granted on the theory that collection of the tax would simply take
money out of one pocket and put it into another. The extent of exemptions granted
depends on the state's constitution and tax law structure. With regard to
purchases made by political subdivisions of a state, an exemption from sales 
taxation is in effect a grant-in-aid by the state. If the exemption did not 
exist, political sub-divisions would be burdened with a tax on their purchase not 
offset by compensating revenue, as is the case of state governments. Also 
government is not the ultimate consumer in the economic sense of the bulk of the 
goods and services it purchases, but uses them to produce government services
for citizens, who are the real consumers. Exemption of such sales is therefore
finconsistent with the theory of a consumer’s expenditures tax. u
2. Commerce Clause exemptions. Section 8, Article 1 of the United States 
Constitution serves to restrict state taxing powers over goods moving 
interstate, Under this "commerce clause" taxing is considered a regulatory power 
and regulations of commerce is limited to Congress. The Supreme Court exercised 
most of the regulatory power and up until 19 -^0 the provisions of the commerce 
clause had always been strictly construed. After the Berwind-White case in 19^ -0, 
a trend toward liberality can be evidenced based on the theory that even inter­
state commerce should be made to pay Its own way. The general theory of 
exempting interstate commerce is to relieve or prevent burdening the flow of
On
commerce between the states.
3. Exemptions arising from taxing policies and social and economic considerations.
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a. Occasional sales. This exemption is usually achieved by ex­
cluding the sale from the definition of a retail sale. Isolated occasional 
sales are generally defined as sales made by a person not engaged in doing 
business. A merchant going out of business may sell his equipment tax free 
but not his inventory. It is likely that there will be no repitition of the 
equipment sale. Also exempt are sales between two private parties; guns, 
automobiles, furniture, etc. The possibilities of collecting the tax are so 
remote that the incurring of the expense is precluded by exempting such a 
s a l e . ^
b. Food. Several of the sales tax states specifically exempt 
food for human consumption thus removing most of the grounds supporting 
the regressivity as well as the low income argument against a sales tax.
Some states tax on premise food consumption and do not tax off premise 
consumption; others exempt both categories. Also certain products already 
subject to certain taxes excise or otherwise may be exempt; oleomargarine, 
beer, etc. The definition of food varies from state to state and the "human 
consumption" wording further complicates the problem. Agreement is almost 
universal that cigarettes are not food. A primary objection to food exemption 
is the substantial revenue loss which necessitates a higher tax rate to raise 
a given sum of money.
c. Producer's goods. Application of the tax to producer's goods 
is objectionable in several ways. The over-all sales tax burden per dollar
of consumer expenditure will not be uniform on all goods, since the ratios of 
cost of taxable capital goods to final selling price of consumption goods will 
vary widely on different products. Shifting of the tax is likely to be less 
perfect, and some pyramiding will be inevitable. Complete exemption of certain 
consumption goods, if desired, cannot be attained since articles used to produce
these goods will be taxed. However, those consumer articles that sell in the 
lowest or zero bracket would bear a portion of the tax burden. The tax will
discriminate against capital-intensive methods of production, and make
8k
modernization of industry more expensive.
d. Services. Many sales taxes are confined largely or entirely 
to physical commodities. While services rendered to business firms are not 
suitable for inclusion within the scope of the taxes because they are producer's 
goods, there is no justification for blanket exclusion of consumer services since 
expenditures on them satisfy personal wants just as do those on commodities. 
Failure to tax services is often a source of administrative problems, because 
some services are rendered in conjunction with the sale of goods, and separation 
of the two elements in the price is troublesome. Repair and other service 
firms are particularly hard hit. General exclusion from tax tends to favor the 
higher income groups, which on the average spend greater percentages of their 
incomes on services.
On the other hand, blanket inclusion of all services is impossible 
partly because many are rendered to business firms, partly because many are 
unsuitable for reasons of social and economic policy, such as: medical and
hospital services. Therefore, taxation of services requires enumeration of 
specific types to be included. A good case could be made for including those 
rendered by commercial establishments such as repairs, laundry, dry cleaning, etc.
e. Religious and charitable exemption. Most common among exemp­
tions accorded to legal persons with respect to all their sales or services is 
that of religious, educational, charitable, or scientific organizations not for 
profit, to the extent that receipt from transactions are devoted to their 
respective purpose. These are indirect bonuses by the state on the grounds of 
social benefit. The principle followed is that the state should not be taxation 
hamper or burden activities that it presently or potentially may perform in
furthering the common welfare.
f. Personal exemptions. Commodity exemptions free from the 
tax many purchases of persons in the higher income levels as well as giving 
rise to arbitrary lines of demarkatlon and discrimination on the basis of 
relative preference. Numberous suggestions have been made for the establishment 
of personal exemptions in lieu of the exemption of food, and other necessities. 
Under this system all persons below a certain level of income would be granted 
exemption on a certain monetary sum of purchases during the year regardless 
of the nature of the commodities purchased. This system'would provide,a 
technique for compensating persons for tax paid during the tax period. 1 Four 
methods have been suggested. First, is the use of tax stamps issued by the 
retailer and redeemed from the government in cash.. Second, is the use of tax 
coupons issued by the government to each family and given to thp retailer wheip 
the purchase is made. Thirdly, the government could Issue a cash allowance to 
each family to compensate for the sales tax. The fourth method would, allow a 
person a credit for sales tax paid against income tax liability, with a 
refund if this credit exceeded income tax liability. The last would be the 
best method because it permits the introduction of one of the mhjor advantages 
of the spendings tax approach to consumption taxation into the framework of 
a sales tax, without giving rise to administrative problems comparable to those 
of a spendings tax.®5
J. Administrative and collection costs.
1. Introduction. The organizations developed to collect the taxes, the 
methods employed, their costs and their relative operating efficiency are factors' i
of prime importance in any appraisal of the tax. No matter how equitable or 
beneficient its effect on the economic system may be, any tax will not long be 
tolerated that is incapable Of reasonably good enforcement with moderate
administrative expense in relation to the revenue it produces. Adam Smith’s 
fourth maxim of taxation states the point succinctly. "Every tax ought 
to be so contrived as ...to take out of the pockets of the people as little, 
as pottsth!** and wnwva whafc it brings inuo the puniifr treasury of the
state.
2. Organizational tesks. The general task to be faced in setting up 
an administrative organization for a retail sales tax involves the following 
principal divisions:
a. Preparation and distribution of tax return forms to taxpayers.
b. Promulgation of rules and regulations interpreting the law and 
the administrative procedure, within the discretionary powers delegated to 
the executive branch.
c. Organizations to process returns and payments and to account' | l
properly for revenue.
d. Organizations to audit returns and perform investigative work 
in the field.
e. Perfection of an enforcement organization and legal procedures 
for dealing with taxpayers who fail or refuse to discharge their liability.
f. Adoption of a public relations policy, defining the relation of; 
the state to retailers and consumers with respect to the tax, and issuing 
such statistical and other data that may acquaint the public with the natufe 
and purpose of the tax. i
3. Nature of sales tax collection costs. Two broad kinds of, costs are 
incurred. First, there are various governmental administration costs , 1 
necessary for processing tax returns and payments and for discovering and 
combatting non-compliance. Secondly, retailers and other taxpayers incur 
certain costs in complying with the various requirements of the tax structure.
•, i "1 • > J ug
ini" r* >< | w i t * v i i.y s*U es rlorkfi in computing 
Wh>»n i retailer's records are examined or audited, additional demands 
are nin.de on his time, and if a dispute arises, there may be costs of 
negotiations and litigation. The compliance costs of consumers would involve 
time lost through controversy and mis-understanding over the amount of tax due,
the annoyance of handling tokens or stamps, and, perhaps the effort of seeking
88avenues  f o r  a v o id in g  th e  t a x .
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Tables 13, it, and 15 present actual cost information gathered by 
Maldon comparing data from 17 states including the leading twelve sales tax 
states. In 1955 the lowest cost per $.100 collected was $0,85 paid by Michigan 
while the highest was Ohio with $3-82. The average costs for the three 
years compared was: 19^0--$2.55, 19^8--$1.31, and 1955--$1»^7^ When relating
the number of auditors and examiners to revenue collections, it is seen that 
generally the states with the highest cost ratios also employ a greater 
number o f  auditors per $1.0 million o f  revenue. A common complaint among 
sales tax administrators was the lack of sufficiently qualified examiners.
About o n e - h a l f  o f  a l l  s a l e s  t a x  s t a t e s  g r a n t  v e n d e r 's  d i s c o u n t s  t o  
com pensa te  them in  whole o r  i n  p a r t  f o r  c o s t s  in c u r r e d  in  t h e i r  com pliance  
y i t h  a co n su m e r 's  t a x  an d ,  p e rh a p s ,  t o  encourage  prompt payment by r e t a i l e r s .  ' 
T h is  p r a c t i c e  r e s u l t s  i n  a d i r e c t  r e d u c t io n  in  revenue  a v a i l a b l e  to, th e  ta x in g ;
« t (i f ' '
. J u r i s d i c t i o n .  D isco u n ts  ranged  from 20 p e r c e n t  in Ohio and Alabama t o  cj.O 
p e r c e n t  i n  C o lo rado  in  1955* T here  i s  no e m p i r ic a l  a n a l y s i s  p u t t i n g  f o r t h  
th e  a c t u a l  v e n d o r 's  c o s t  b u t  i n  e v e ry  s t a t e  a u t h o r i z i n g  such ad  Valorem 
d i s c o u n t s ,  t h e  c o s t  o f  such  d is c o u n t s  exceeded  th e  s t a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' c o s t s .
K. Summary of the retail sales tax, "The sales tax is the traditional method 
by which governments seek to distribute the burden of the cost of their 
activities in relation to consumption expenditures, in lieu of la feasible method
88,
TABLE NUMBER 13
State Administration Costs of collecting pei $100 of Sales and Use tax arid Revenue 
by State, selected year.
STATE 1940 1940 1955
Ohio 1 .9 0 1.10 3.82
California 2 .6 0 1.84 2 .0 1
Florida I — .. 1 ,85
Maryland 2.00 1.76
Alabama 4 .5 0 2.23 '1.68
North Carolina .67 lr58
South Carolina 1.58
Illinois 2,00 2.00 ; 1.48
Michigan 1.T0 .96
•85
Average 2.55 1 .31 1 .47'’if
Source: National Tax Journal, Volume 10, p.230-31.
TABLE NUMBER l4
N’lmber of Sales Tax Auditors and Examiners and the number £er millions of dollars
of Revenue collected: Selected States, 1955♦ i;
STATE NUMBER AUDITORS AUDITORS PEfr MILLIONS COLLECTION
Maryland 63 1.80
1
North Carolina 98 1.68
California 735 1.50
Florida 111 1.50
Ohio 201 .97
Illinois 109 .53
Michigan 219 .73
S o u  I jOH 'Ft***& ^ £ <**’V Mjl , y*&i tCj
STATE
Colorado
Maryland
Florida
Oklahoma
North Carolina
Ohio
/CO* ; ,
TABLE NUMBER
Vendors Discounts, Selected States, 1955 
(thousands of dollars) 1
AMOUNT OF DISCOUNT I DISCOUNT A$ A PERCENTAGE
OF YIELD ■
1,828 ' 4.931,
1,082 3.09
2 , 1^  2.90
1,2^9 2.07
1,610 2.76
3,883 1.87
t'tJTndrti
of composing a tax directly upon these expenditures, under circumstances 
such that, for political, economic, or administrative reasons, income
oo
or wealth-based taxes are incapable of yielding adequate revenues."
The sales tax once introduced as emergency measures have been insured
permanency by reason of their high revenue productivity. Its major
attractions are:
1. A Bales tax is capable of raising large amounts of revenue in a
way that is relatively convenient both to the government and to the taxpayer.
2 . It reaches resources otherwise immune from taxation.
3. In periods of deflation sales tax yield is likely to fall less
than that of other major taxes.
4. A sales tax is less inimical to the competitive position of a 
state than other major taxes.
Its major criticisms are:
1. A sales tax If broad in scope, is regressive in relation to income 
and discriminates unfairly against large families.
2 . A sales tax, if made less regressive by exemptions and exclusions, 
becomes capricious in its incidence, administratively complex, and more 
modest in its yield.
3. Exclusion of services from the tax base is neither equitable nor 
administratively simple, but their inclusion runs countef to prevailing 
practice.
! ■ > 1
4. Taxation of producer goods involves multiple taxation but Ihpir 
exclusion from the tax base leads to evasion and a v o i d a n c e .
With respect to the form of the sales tax, apart from certain administrative 
aspects, the retail sales tax is by far the superior type, in terms pf equit*y, 
intended distribution of burden, and avoidance of economic effect. Experience 
with the multiple-stage tax has demonstrated its complete unsuitability in
in the way of discrimination against various business firms, of incentive 
given to Integration, of unequal burden on various consumer expenditures,
I
and the inevitable complexity which arises out of the attempt to mitigate the
i,
worst discriminatory features. Any of the single stage forms of tax is ' 
superior to the turnover tax, and the retail levy offers the greatest 
advantages along the lines of uniformity of burdens on various consumer 
expenditures, avoidance of discrimination among firms in ;Various distribution 
channels, lower tax rate for a given revenue and easier administration. The 
one major disadvantage is the problem of collecting the tax from large 
numbers of small firms.
In the establishment of the structure of a sales tax, it is highly
desirable to restrict the tax so far as possible to the sale of Consumption
goods since the taxation of producer's goods is contrary to the Intept and 
philosophy of the tax, yet attainment of this goal is difficult because
i
particular commodities can be used for either production or consumption. On 
the other hand, it is desirable to insure as broad a coverage of consumption 
expenditures as possible, to avoid discrimination against various' consumers.. 
With different preferences, reallocation of resources, and administrative
problems, exemptions must be limited to those instances In which very strong
' - ' , <■
justification can be advanced; food, for example.
With high increasing levels of government expenditures, and; pressure 
against extremely high income tax rates, the sales tax, highly productive 
at moderate rates, is almost certain to remain an important eleWent In ,
9 ' i ' ' ' '
state tax structures; only the development of an administra tivffcy feasible 
expenditure tax could make its demise possible and this Is clearly unlikely 
in the foreseeable future.
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